C. Integration into a combat system
Due to the consistency of action and the responsiveness it offers to the armed forces, connectivity between people, carriers and weapons systems will be decisive in the battles of tomorrow. The FC/ASW thus aims to be integrated into a global architecture, so that it can be used in conjunction with the other components of the same combat system.
Today, most missiles are programmed before launch: after firing, the target can no longer be changed. On some systems the launch platform can nevertheless continue to transmit information after firing in order to change the targets during navigation. In the future, networking will enable all components of the combat system, and not just the launcher, to re-programme the missile in flight if necessary. This capacity has become essential to carry out anti-ship and SEAD missions.
This is because FC/ASW is intended to be part of the architecture of the weapon systems of the future - characterised, under the influence of the digital revolution, as “collaborative combat” ([87]). The development of these integrated systems is now being driven with strong determination on the part of both countries. France, for example, has agreed to jointly develop a Future Combat Air System programme with Germany, while the UK announced, on 16 July 2018, the launch of its own Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, the Tempest programme. While both France and the UK may continue to develop their separate FCAS projects, the work undertaken together, particularly in the field of drones, will require continued close cooperation in order to ensure the compatibility and inter-operability of future systems.
Thanks to these weapons systems of the future, the French and British forces will be better equipped to respond to the intensification of threats and the existence of more agile enemies. The interconnection of the naval and air platforms will enable FC/ASW to network with all the sensors of future combat systems. When a sensor detects a threat, the missile's targeting will adjust in real time, increasing the force's responsiveness.
In order to produce this integration into combat systems, the data links and connectivity need to be developed, making sure that they cannot be jammed. The system will also have to be employable in a less sophisticated manner, allowing for example strike on sight in the event of a loss of connectivity, regardless of the reason.
While all of these performance options are currently being considered by the two countries, the final choices will not be made until the end of the concept phase, scheduled for 2020.
IV. Programme procurement stages: relying on the strength of the UK-France relationship
As outlined in Chapter One, the launch of the FC/ASW programme dates back to the signing of the Lancaster House Treaty on 2 November 2010. Since then, each summit has seen both countries reassert their support for this programme ([88]). At the latest Sandhurst Summit on January 18, 2018, both Governments stated that they would “Continue the FC/ASW design phase to determine the optimal combination of solutions to replace our anti-ship missiles and cruise missiles”.
It is worth noting, however, that the procurement process in each country, is subject to different procedures and rules ([89]). In France, the conduct of arms programmes is set out in a ministerial directive ([90]). The United Kingdom’s acquisition policy is set according to: the “Concept, Assessment, Development, Manufacturing, In-service, Disposal” cycle (CADMID). Intergovernmental agreements signed at each new stage of the programme have enabled the British and French acquisition procedures to be reconciled.
The overall timeline of the FC/ASW programme shows four main stages: the preliminary study (2011-2014), the concept study (2017-2020), the design phase (2020-2024) and the development and production phase (2024-2030).
A. Early Stages of FC/ASW pointed to a common operational requirement
Following the launch of the FC/ASW programme at Lancaster House, France and the United Kingdom concluded a technical study in November 2011, which launched the preliminary study in partnership with MBDA.
THE PERSEUS CONCEPT
At regular intervals, MBDA launches a call for ideas on a specific topic to which teams of young employees from all the countries in which MBDA operates respond. Through an internal assessment process, an idea is selected - called a “concept vision” - which is presented at the Euronaval Fair and to which MBDA grants resources so that it can develop.
In 2011, the project presented, named Perseus, was a supersonic, stealthy and highly manoeuvrable missile intended to replace the Harpoon and Exocet missiles as well as the SCALP/Storm Shadow.
Speaking to the joint inquiry evidence session in Paris, Antoine Bouvier explained that Perseus was simply a concept study that had resulted from six months of work carried out by a team of ten young people. He argued that Perseus “could no longer be compared to the system being discussed today in terms of budget and technical studies” ([91]).
The aim of this first study was to refine the operational needs of the two countries and to identify, in broad terms, the missile concepts likely to meet them. It implied the exchange of sensitive data between the two countries, with an increasing level of sensitivity in the information exchanged over time ([92]).
The preliminary study, which ended in 2014, made it possible to measure the high degree of convergence by defining each country’s operational need. Given the common operational requirements, at the Amiens summit on 3 March 2016 both Governments declared their intention of continuing the FC/ASW programme.
B. Work in progress: tightening the number of missile concepts under review
Following the declaration of intent of the Amiens Summit, the FC/ASW programme reached a new stage with the launch of the concept phase as part of an agreement between the two governments, announced on 28 March 2017 ([93]). The contract was signed with MBDA on 31 March 2017.
Costing €100 million, funded equally by France and the United Kingdom, the contract signed with MBDA is intended to extend over a period of up to 36 months. This contract is monitored by a joint project team set up by the Direction Générale de l'Armement [DGA] and its British counterpart, Defence Equipment and Support [DE&S].
The concept study is aimed at deepening the understanding of the possibilities offered by each of the missile architectures with regard to the two countries’ operational needs. Beyond the intrinsic capabilities of the missile in terms of stealth or speed, the armed forces need an effective weapon that is capable of reaching its target. This has meant testing the different missile concepts within different employment scenarios.
Overall, there have been two main tranches of the concept phase’s work:
● One 18-month tranche, comprising two stages:
– the initial architecture review (“Initial Review”), passed in January 2018, which allows an initial selection of several missile concepts to be made; and
– the main architecture review (“Key Review”), planned for early 2019, which will make it possible to select the most promising concepts from the initial review.
● One instalment of 21 months ([94]) during which more in-depth studies are conducted on the concepts selected during the main architectural review and certain technological risks are identified.
Ultimately, the concept study, which is scheduled to end in 2020, should make it possible to identify one or more solutions capable of meeting the requirements expressed by France and the United Kingdom. Beyond their ability to meet the operational requirements of both countries, the solutions will be selected on the basis of acquisition cost and the credibility of the implementation timetable. It should be reiterated that the final choice will not necessarily rest on a single vector but could be based on a family of vectors making it possible, separately, to secure the anti-ship capacity and suppression of air defences on the one hand, and the capacity for deep strike on the other.
In parallel, the concept study will also make it possible to establish the road maps for maturing the technologies required to ensure the development of the various solutions selected.
C. Beyond 2020: time to make choices
At the end of the concept study, the French and British authorities will have to come down in favour of one or more systems that will enter the design phase. Scheduled to start in 2020, the design phase, during which missile prototypes will be developed, is expected to last until 2024. Subsequently, the development and production of FC/ASW is expected to be launched in 2024, so that the current weapons systems can be replaced by 2030.
The continuation of the FC/ASW programme beyond the concept phase will require, after 2020, that new bilateral agreements be concluded between France and the United Kingdom. For political momentum around this programme to be sustained, the two countries’ ability to resolve certain outstanding issues will undoubtedly be essential. These issues are discussed in the next chapter of this report.
CHAPTER III Future issues to resolve
While witnesses in London and Paris told the joint inquiry that the Concept Phase had made good progress to date and was on track to complete its work in 2020 ([95]), there are a number of key issues that will need to be resolved if the programme is to progress after 2020. These include how the UK chooses to fill the anti-ship missile capability gap which will emerge between Harpoon's exit from service in 2023 and the potential entry into service of FC/ASW anti-ship missile in 2030; the ability of the two countries to agree on whether the FC/ASW programme should prioritise subsonic or supersonic missiles; the procurement process for selecting the developer of the FC/ASW; and the interoperability of FC/ASW with other platforms, including those built by other allies.
I. The UK's anti-ship missile capability gap between 2023 and 2030
One of the most pressing issues that needs to be resolved, and one with potentially significant implications for the FC/ASW programme, is how the UK should address the capability gap it faces in anti-ship missiles after Harpoon exits service in 2023.
A. The UK's current anti-ship missile capabilities
1. Harpoon
In service since 1984, Harpoon is the Royal Navy's sole heavyweight anti-ship missile system. It has a range of 80 miles and is fitted to Type 23 Frigates and three Type 45 Destroyers. A submarine variant was previously in service on the Trafalgar-class submarines but was withdrawn in 2003. In its analysis of the Harpoon missile, the ThinkDefence website explains:
Guidance for Harpoon is performed initially by information provided by the launch platform. Waypoints and mid-course changes can also be programmed into the initial guidance system. Terminal guidance is carried out using the integral radar seeker. The attack profile is also selectable at launch.
Because of the lack of a data link and the radar terminal guidance feature, Royal Navy Harpoons are often considered to be obsolete in a contemporary operating environment ([96].
Initially expected to exit service in 2018, Harpoon's life has been extended, according to the MoD witnesses to our inquiry, until 2023 ([97]). They also told us that from 2023 onwards, the Royal Navy's specialist anti-ship missile capabilities are to come from anti-ship missiles fired from Wildcat maritime helicopters.
2. Helicopter-launched anti-ship missiles
From 1982 until 2017, the Royal Navy's helicopter-fired anti-ship missile was the Sea Skua. Carried on Lynx helicopters, the Sea Skua had a semi-active homing radar and a range of about 15km. It was the first missile system developed specifically for the Fleet Air Arm and was successfully deployed in both the Falklands conflict and the first Gulf War ([98]).
Sea Skua's replacement, which will likely enter service in 2020, is the Sea Venom/Anti-Navire Léger anti-ship missile. The Sea Venom will weigh around 100kg and will be armed with a 30kg warhead and guided by an imaging infrared seeker. The missile is designed to destroy targets ranging from small, fast attack craft through to full-sized corvettes, while also allowing for a land attack capability if required. It is designed to be ‘fire-and-forget’, but an embarked two-way datalink will “enable capabilities such as in-flight re-targeting, aimpoint correction/refinement, and safe abort; semi-active laser guidance, if enabled, would allow for the engagement of targets outside the line of sight in concert with third-party laser designation” ([99]).
In March 2014, the UK and French Governments signed a demonstration and manufacture contract which will cover the development of the Sea Venom/ANL until completion, fund the demonstration phase of the programme, and the manufacturing of the missile. The contract was signed by the UK's Defence Equipment and Support Organisation, acting on behalf of the two governments. The jointly funded contract is worth £500 million and will be managed as part of MBDA's Team Complex Weapons portfolio. It is thought that a joint project office in Bristol will be staffed by French defence procurement agency (DGA) and UK Defence Equipment & Support personnel and that the contract will result in 200 UK jobs and 200 posts based in France ([100]).
According to MBDA, Sea Venom « will maintain some of the characteristics of Sea Skua […] and retain compatibility with existing logistic footprints, thereby allowing current users of these systems to upgrade easily » and offers the following advantages:
– Reduced modifications to existing ship storage and handling equipment ;
– Minimal impact on logistics and through-life costs ;
– Increased platform survivability against defended targets due to stand-off range and two-way data link.
In July 2017 it was revealed that the first successful test firings of the Sea Venom/ANL anti-ship missile project had taken place in 2017 ([101]). A second successful test-firing took place in April 2018 ([102]).
Wildcat helicopters will also be equipped with Martlet missiles, otherwise known as the Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (FASGW) Light or the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM). Developed by Thales, the Martlet will deployed for use against small boats, including Rigid-hulled Inflatable Boats (RIBs). It has a range of up to 8km. According to Thales:
LMM is a low cost, lightweight, precision strike, missile, which has been designed to be fired from tactical platforms including fixed or rotary winged UAVs and surface platforms. The system is designed to provide a rapid reaction to a wide range of the surface threats from wheeled or tracked vehicles, towed artillery or static installations; naval threats from small ships and fast inshore attack craft and an air threat from light aircraft ([103]).
B. The capability gap
Harpoon's initial exit from service date was 2018 which, together with the gap between Sea Skua's withdrawal from – and Sea Venom's entry into - service, would have resulted in a two-year period where the Royal Navy had no specialist anti-ship missile capability at all, as well as an extended gap where there was no heavyweight anti-ship missile capability.
The extension of Harpoon's lifespan until 2023 only partially alleviates this gap as the FC/ASW programme is not due to yield a heavyweight system until 2030. As things stand, from 2023 until 2030, the Royal Navy will be reliant on Helicopter-fired anti-ship missiles, submarine-launched torpedoes, and the guns on its frigates and destroyers.
C. Filling the gap: bridging measures or a longer term option?
There are a number of options available to the UK MoD for filling the anti-ship missile capability gap after 2023: these range from short-term, bridging 'fixes' that would be consistent with the FC/ASW programme to a longer-term replacement that could call into question the FC/ASW programme.
1. Further extensions to the lifespan of Harpoon
The MoD has mentioned the possibility of a "longer extension in service" for Harpoon beyond 2023. However, during their appearances before the joint inquiry on 11 July, both the then Minister for Defence Procurement, Guto Bebb MP, and Sir Simon Bollom conceded that such an extension "looks very challenging", particularly due to the issues that Harpoon's advanced age poses for its energetics, the propulsion system and the warhead ([104]). This is not to mention the concerns that already exist about Harpoon being an obsolete anti-ship missile platform in the contemporary operational environment ([105]).
2. An off-the-shelf replacement for Harpoon
In light of the above considerations, it may be reasonable for the MoD to procure an off-the-shelf anti-ship missile capability to bridge the gap after 2023. The MoD was clear, in its evidence to the joint inquiry, that there were a number of options available to the UK which were being actively examined. According to Guto Bebb, exploring these options, in addition to the concept phase work, was an important part of making sure that the MoD had a "coherent overview of all the options open to us" ([106]).
According to Naval Technology, the possible off-the-shelf alternatives that could be considered by the MoD include the following:
– Lockheed Martin's Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM): the LRASM comes with both air and vertical canister launch capabilities, relies on on-board systems for target acquisition without the need for GPS navigation or external data-feeds and is able to defeat jamming and detection measures. It offers interoperability with the F-35. The LRASM will enter service for the US Air Force this year and the US Navy next year. Australia, the UK and Canada are reported to have expressed interest in the missile. Cost per unit is in the realm of $700,000-1,000,000.
– Naval Strike Missile (NSM): the multi-role variant of this missile, jointly developed by Kongsberg and Raytheon, would be compatible with the F-35 and would offer lower costs than the LRASM or the latest Harpoon variant. According to Raytheon, the NSM is “proven, affordable — and available today. The Naval Strike Missile is a long-range, precision strike weapon that can find and destroy enemy ships at distances up to 100 nautical miles away”. The NSM's lifespan extends until 2040 ([107]).
– RBS15 Mk3: produced by Saab, the RBS15 Mk3 is, according to Naval Technology, “packed with a range of high-end features, including sophisticated electronic counter-measures (ECM) and an advanced graphical user interface […] it carries a heavy, high-explosive blast and pre-fragmented warhead over a range of around 134 nautical miles and at a speed of 0.9 mach”.
– The MoD could seek to procure the Block II+ variant of Harpoon. The US Navy is due to introduce the Block II+ this year and it “offers greater reliability and survivability” than previous variants, including new GPS guidance and a new data link that offers “in-flight updates”, as well as improved target selectivity and “enhanced resistance to electronic countermeasures”.
– Another alternative could be deploying the latest version of the Exocet MM40 Block 3 system. The Royal Navy operated Exocets until 2002 and according to Naval Technology, the Block 3 offers an increased range of 97 nautical miles and “a number of other enhancements and upgrades, including changes to its navigational system which now accepts GPS waypoints to enable it to use different angles of attack against naval targets and to provide a limited land-attack capability” ([108]). An upgraded Exocet model, the Block 3 C will soon be available to the French Navy and, according to Janes, offers "a new coherent active radio frequency (RF) seeker as the centrepiece of a ‘digitised’ guidance and navigation package" that should bring "significant improvements in target selectivity and electronic countermeasures performance" ([109]).
In addition to the above systems, MBDA Italia's Otomat MK2 Block IV was also listed, among the available options to the UK, by Lt General Sir Mark Poffley during his appearance before the joint inquiry ([110]).
During the London session, Poffley made clear that the MoD wanted a surface to surface anti-ship missile to fill the capability gap. However, he conceded that there was not a funded line in the equipment plan for such a purchase and that it was therefore one of the MoD's "aspirations" for the Modernising Defence Programme ([111]).
If the MoD chooses, and secure funding for, an off-the-shelf purchase, this could have significant implications for the FC/ASW programme. In Paris, we heard that the DGA and MBDA acknowledged that the UK would want to close the capability gap, but witnesses urged caution over how this should be done ([112]).
Joël Barre, the Chief Executive of DGA, for example, warned that while he "fully understood that the capability gap must be closed […] the decision you [the UK] make in that regard should not jeopardise our co-operation on the FC/ASW" ([113]). In particular, M. Barre urged the UK MoD to opt for a "relatively short-term" bridging solution, rather than trying to replace the Harpoon with a missile that would still be available by 2030. If the UK MoD were to choose the latter, M. Barre considered that it would have to acquire a missile whose performance was lower than the FC/ASW, arguing that there were currently no missiles on the market that met the operational need the FC/ASW programme was aiming to cover by 2030 ([114]). In short, M. Barre's concern was that in choosing a replacement for Harpoon, the UK should not choose an alternative to FC/ASW or make a choice which "will postpone our objectives for the FC/ASW" ([115]).
Chris Allam, MBDA UK's Managing Director, similarly told us that he considered any decision to fill the capability gap after 2023 as a potential risk to the FC/ASW programme ([116]). Mr Allam suggested that "an interim gap-filler […] would be the best way forward - in other words, something that continues the capability they have" ([117]).
While a further extension to Harpoon's lifespan was deemed possible by some of the witnesses heard by the joint inquiry, another option put forward during our session in Paris was the procurement of Exocet. Joël Barre, for example, said that he would be "more than happy" to offer Exocet to the MoD as a way of bridging the capability gap after 2023, while Admiral Prazuck indicated that he was aware that Exocet was "one of the options that the Royal Navy was looking into" ([118]).
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For the Royal Navy to be an effective force its surface fleet must be properly equipped with a suite of offensive and defensive weapons. To date, this has included a specialist, heavyweight anti-ship missile capability, in the form of the Harpoon missile system. When Harpoon exits service in 2023, there will be a serious capability gap, until the potential entry into service of FC/ASW programme in 2030. This gap will not be adequately filled by the smaller and more lightweight anti-ship missiles that will be available from 2020 onwards on the Navy's Wildcat helicopters.
We appreciate that the MoD will want to fill this capability gap, and there are a number of 'bridging' options available, varying in age, cost and capabilities. However, the MoD will need to weigh carefully the implications of any choice for both the FC/ASW programme and the broader state of UK-French defence relations, as well as for the UK industrial base.
It is clear from the evidence gathered by our joint inquiry that any decision to procure a 'bridging' system with long post-2030 life expectancy would not be viewed favourably in Paris and could pose a serious threat to the strong bilateral relationship that has developed since 2010.
Alongside the work being undertaken by the FC/ASW concept phase, the MoD should conduct a careful analysis of the various options for filling the capability gap. This analysis should include a technical assessment of: the potential for Harpoon's lifespan to be extended; whether other existing capabilities could be augmented to provide a stronger anti-ship function; the various off-the-shelf options that exist, including the procurement of Harpoon Block II for the P8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft; and the potential procurement of Exocet as a surface-to-surface capability for the Royal Navy.
In making these assessments, the MoD should carefully balance the savings that could be made in procuring an existing system against the potential costs to the UK industrial base - in terms of jobs and skills and the UK's sovereign capabilities - and to the UK-French defence relationship.
II. Reaching convergence on key requirements
If the Concept Phase is successfully to result in both partners agreeing to further progress the FC/ASW programme, then convergence will need to be reached on key operational and capability requirements ([119]). At present, it seems that there is considerable agreement on the threat picture both countries face, e.g. the challenges of penetration and survivability of missiles and anti-access/area denial, and on what they need, in the broadest capability sense, from the programme ([120]). Nonetheless, there remain important areas where convergence between both Governments is still to be reached.
Stealth versus velocity ? The challenge of reaching convergence on remaining issues is particularly acute in the case of whether priority should be given to the development of supersonic and manoeuvrable or subsonic and stealthier missile systems. Historically, French military and industrial actors have prioritised speed over stealth, considering that speed made it possible to increase the survivability of the missile by depriving the adversary of time to react. This is in contrast to the general approach taken by the UK which has favoured stealthier missile systems. This cross-channel divergence was outlined by Antoine Bouvier in his evidence to the joint inquiry:
In France and Britain we have different operational cultures and ways of doing things. We have different operational and technological cultures. To keep it simple, in France the technological and operational culture is based more on speed and hyper-velocity, whereas in Britain stealth and manoeuvrability are more in favour ([121]).
Both options have been explored so far by the Concept Phase ([122]). In our evidence session in Paris, the question of whether both countries can converge on a shared solution was raised as a key issue by Joël Barre, Admiral Prazuck and Antoine Bouvier ([123]).
Admiral Prazuck suggested that his preference would be for both approaches to be compared side by side "to see which is more effective" ([124]). Antoine Bouvier suggested a similar process, telling us that "France and Britain should come together and put on the table all the pros and cons of both techniques […] each country should present the merits and limitations of both technical solutions, so as to arrive at the best solution" ([125]).
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Convergence on key operational and capability requirements will be essential to any successful move from the Concept Phase to a fully-fledged FC/ASW programme. One of the most important areas where convergence needs to be met is in the question of whether the programme should give precedence to supersonic or subsonic, but stealthy, missiles.
Reaching convergence on this matter may not necessarily require a zero-sum decision between stealth or velocity. One possible solution, that should be explored during the Concept Phase, should be a supersonic anti-ship missile accompanied by a stealthier deep-strike missile, both missiles sharing, nevertheless, a high degree of similarity on certain components. Such an approach would build on the respective strengths of both countries in missile development and, as a result, could lead to a more efficient distribution of development and production work.
III. The Procurement Process
For the FC/ASW to progress after 2020 both Governments will need to agree on the procurement process for selecting the programme's prime contractor. In essence, this is a choice between an open competition and the award of the main contract to MBDA without a competition.
When the joint inquiry took evidence in London, we put this question to the MoD. In response, the then Minister for Defence Procurement, Guto Bebb told us that this was a "fair question" and that the "United Kingdom's default position is always to look at competition as the best option in ensuring value for money" ([126]).
In Paris, however, Joël Barre indicated strongly to us that he did not see merit in putting MBDA "in competition with anyone else at the end of the concept phase". M. Barre repeatedly stressed that, in his opinion, MBDA was "the single missile manufacturer in Europe ([127])." According to M. Barre, MBDA is an "important strategic asset" for both the UK and France, which meant that "it must manufacture the missiles". In pointing to the potential problems of an open tendering process, M. Barre highlighted the risk that such a move might open the process up to the US. He also emphasized the sensitive data and information that had already been exchanged with MBDA and between Governments as part of the concept phase. According to M. Barre, "we cannot jeopardise our initial choice after we have gone through all these steps". However, he conceded that he had not yet discussed the potential procurement process with his London counterparts ([128]).
While we did not discuss the procurement process with MBDA, Chris Allam emphasized the importance of FC/ASW to the company. According to Mr Allam, FC/ASW is "the type of programme that keeps MBDA at the leading edge of missile design" and, therefore, preserves, the skills that we have developed in the missile sector in Europe.
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MBDA is a unique, UK-French enterprise with a substantial set of expertise and skills in the missile manufacturing process. That MBDA was chosen to conduct the concept phase is itself a vote of confidence in its abilities and we note the significance of the potential FC/ASW contract to the maintenance, and development, of MBDA's footprint in both the UK and France. If the final decision is indeed taken to award the main contract to MBDA without a competition, safeguards will need to be in place to ensure value for money for both countries.
We recognise that UK and French Governments have traditionally adopted different approaches to defence procurement and that reaching agreement might take some time. However, it is surprising that the two Governments appear not yet to have discussed the potential procurement process for the FC/ASW programme. While the concept phase was only launched in 2017, the swift turnaround envisaged following its conclusion in 2020 requires both Governments to be aligned on the procurement process. We recommend that both Governments begin discussions on the potential procurement process for the FC/ASW programme and reach a tentative agreement on such a process by the time the phase concludes in 2020.
IV. Interoperability
Both the UK and France are likely to conduct major operations only as part of a broader coalition such as NATO, and interoperability is therefore a central requirement for military platforms. This is true also within armed forces, particularly where different assets have been the subject of separate procurement processes. In London, Lt General Sir Mark Poffley told us that, from the UK perspective, with weapons systems such as the FC/ASW, "we would want to be interoperable with many nations that are close and dear to us", not least because of the benefits such interoperability may bring in terms of exports ([129]).
During the session in London, Sir Simon Bollom also indicated that the UK would want to integrate the FC/ASW onto the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in the future ([130]). Such an integration would raise questions about the interoperability of FC/ASW with the Autonomics Logistics System (ALIS) software, developed by Lockheed Martin, which plays a key role in the management and day-to-day operation of the F-35.
When the joint inquiry met in Paris, M. Barre indicated that he too wished to see a system "that can be interoperable and open […] and able to connect with different kinds of systems" and compatible with "the systems that our allies could have, especially our American allies" ([131]). M. Barre also stressed that, despite the imperative to be open and interoperable, "we must none the less keep our sovereignty" and that technologies involved must be "under our [European] control [..] so that we have no restrictions when it comes to using or exporting them" ([132]).
It is essential that the FC/ASW is interoperable with a broad range of platforms deployed by the UK and France's allies. This is both for commercial and, more importantly, operational reasons. The FC/ASW will therefore need to be capable of being integrated with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and interoperable with the ALIS system and the MADL data link that enables F-35s to exchange sensitive information.
Preserving our sovereign control on the future missiles is not incompatible with the priority given to the interoperability with the platforms used by our allies. Therefore, we urge both Governments and MBDA to explore, during the next half of the concept phase, how interoperability with allies such as the United States and with platforms that are primarily built by US companies, and or which rely on US software, can be provided. This can be done without prejudice to the UK's and France's sovereign control of the FC/ASW programme.
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This chapter has identified a number of important issues that need to be resolved for the FC/ASW programme to progress successfully after the concept phase concludes in 2020. Resolving these issues will require a spirit of pragmatism and compromise from both countries. However, while these issues are significant, they are not insuperable and, in light of the UK and France's long and strong relationship, we are fully confident in the capacity of our two countries to reach agreement.
CHAPTER IV Ultimately a flagship programme in the interests of both countries
As the representatives of the British and French authorities remarked during the joint hearings in London and Paris, France and the United Kingdom are the two main military powers in Europe. This situation has led both countries to build a strong bilateral relationship, which has intensified steadily over recent years ([133]).
In London, the then Minister for Defence Procurement, Guto Bebb MP, emphasised the significant deepening of the bilateral relationship. He referred to the conduct of joint operations, whether escort arrangements to protect the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle or the British command and assault ship Albion or, more recently, strikes carried out in Syria with American forces and the deployment of British CH-47 Chinook helicopters to the Sahel with the Barkhane force. He also welcomed our cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, listing in particular: “the joint development of certain research capacities, like the Teutates programme” ([134]).
In Paris, Admiral Christophe Prazuck, Chief of Navy Staff, also referred to the importance of the escorts provided by one country for a surface vessel belonging to the other’s fleet and recalled that last spring both countries conducted a joint amphibious exercise, Catamaran, as part of the formation of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) ([135]). Some of the areas of cooperation listed by Mr Joël Barre, General Delegate for Armaments, included: “the area of mine warfare”, in which a demonstrator project has been initiated, as well as “the field of combat aviation technologies, in accordance with the refocusing agreed together at the Sandhurst summit last January”. Lastly, he re-emphasised that: “the ANL programme is also under way” ([136]).
Franco-British cooperation in the field of defence therefore goes beyond the FC/ASW programme, but this programme is now widely recognised to form a cornerstone of such cooperation.
This is because the importance of the FC/ASW programme lies not just in the design and construction of a new weapons system, offering our forces new capabilities in terms of anti-ship strikes, the suppression of enemy air defences and deep strikes, but also in the potential benefits in terms of sovereign capability, our respective industrial bases and the value for money gains that could accrue from acting together.
I. Preserving national sovereignty and freedom of action
The experience of the SCALP/Storm Shadow deep strike programme shows the advantages of cooperation that maintains strategic autonomy. Despite this being a joint programme, both the UK and France have been free to deploy these missiles when acting independently of one another. As a result, the United Kingdom was able, independently, to freely fire Storm Shadow missiles in Iraq in 2003, and France was able to do the same with SCALPs in Libya in 2011. More broadly, the preservation of national sovereignty guarantees freedom of action, e.g. the capacity to intervene whenever national interests are threatened, without having to give guarantees or to require any authorisation from a third-party state.
Guaranteeing this independence is at the heart of the Lancaster House Agreement, the first paragraph of Article 9 indicating that: “the two Parties agree to develop and maintain key industrial capacities and defence technologies in order to improve their independence in the field of key defence technologies and increase the security of their supply and to develop the operational capacities of their armed forces”.
By entrusting MBDA with the completion of the concept phase of the FC/ASW programme, the British and French authorities have therefore chosen to ensure that they have full control over this weapon, not only in operational terms, but equally from a technological and industrial viewpoint. Jointly developed, this future missile would ensure the preservation of their national sovereignty, from start to finish.
II. Deepening bilateral relations in the field of defence
A. From a political standpoint
Since 23 June 2016, both Governments have repeatedly highlighted the continuing importance of the Franco-British defence relationship, regardless of the UK’s withdrawal of the European Union. The last bilateral summit also emphasized “the unique and close relationship between our countries, two of the oldest and greatest democracies in the world” ([137]). More recently, at the Franco-British Defence Council on 20 September 2018, Mrs Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, reiterated that the partnership [between France and the UK] is as crucial as ever, regardless of Brexit”. On the same day, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the British Armed Forces, Sir Nicholas Carter, recalled that “the London-Paris connection is vital for Defence”.
As discussed earlier, the bilateral relationship goes well beyond the FC/ASW programme. This has intensified significantly since the signing of the Lancaster House agreement, Sir Mark Poffley also noting “a significant change in our relationship over the past five years. It has become one of the strongest in terms of both threat analysis and the ability to translate this into military capabilities”. According to him, both the French Army Staff and the Directorate-General for Armaments have moved very close to the British Ministry of Defence, this movement resulting in an increase in the exchange of information.
From this point of view, the FC/ASW programme is an opportunity to intensify this relationship, as its success requires the exchange of highly sensitive information. For example, the integration of the future missile into the F35 will probably require the use of information to which the French authorities do not have access. Other highly sensitive information could be difficult to share, such as countermeasures or threat assessment datasets. In order to facilitate this, the authorities of both countries have begun discussions to determine the conditions for exchange of information, while France, under the auspices of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), has undertaken a reform of its classification system in order to bring it more into line with the practices of other European countries, and in particular the United Kingdom.
B. From the operational standpoint
If successful, the FC/ASW programme would be an important pillar of both countries' freedom of military action.
It would also serve as a key platform enabling interoperability between our two countries. Certainly, the interoperability of these future missiles constitutes both a challenge and an opportunity to step up the integration of our forces with those of our allies. Today, the British and French forces are already largely interoperable. This is due mainly to our common membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which provides a means of standardising military equipment. In the future, it is important that this interoperability be maintained, in order, to enable both countries to develop and maintain their own standards and products.
Interoperability is all the more essential as it facilitates the conduct of coalition operations. Indeed, while the ability quickly to design operational readiness is essential to the success of an intervention, building sophisticated weapons systems together simplifies their coordinated employment. When the British, Americans and French struck in Syria a few months ago, the operation was facilitated by interoperability between their forces.
Finally, successfully achieving a cooperative programme makes it possible to increase the stock of missiles ordered by both countries, through a reduction in unit costs.
III. Contributing to the defence of Europe
Although negotiations are still ongoing to determine the basis of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, the joint communiqué issued at the end of the Sandhurst Summit stated that “while this Summit takes place as the United Kingdom prepares to leave the EU, the United Kingdom is not leaving Europe.” Indeed, Guto Bebb MP told the joint inquiry that there was “no doubt that we want to be involved in European initiatives and projects, even after Brexit”.
In this context, cooperation on arms systems is an essential component in achieving European cooperation on defence. On the French side, the military programming law [LPM] for 2019-2025 clearly calls for this European slant: “the equipment programmes launched during the 2019-2025 LPM will be primarily designed in a European cooperation path”. The FC/ASW is identified as one of the key projects to be carried out in the coming years. On the British side, the Chief of the Defence Staff stated in the press on 20 September 2018 that “what provides a decisive advantage is the long-term building of mutual trust and respect-based relationships, born of joint training, joint testing of doctrine and tactics, and the joint development of military capability” ([138]).
Therefore, the joint design, development and, ultimately, use of such a strategic weapon can only enhance both countries' participation in the defence of Europe.
IV. Buttressing the two countries' defence industrial base
The strengthening and sustainability of the two countries’ industrial and technological base lies at the heart of the FC/ASW programme.
As explained above, the Lancaster House agreement instituted mutual dependence. This has resulted in the establishment of shared Franco-British centres of excellence, which should make it possible to optimise resources and reduce duplication in a number of technological areas between the French and British subsidiaries, thereby generating economies of scale to the benefit of MBDA's competitiveness.
The challenge now lies in consolidating a binational missile industry, based on a sovereign, sustainable and competitive prime contractor and equipment manufacturers, capable of developing the most modern missiles in the long term. The FC/ASW programme will require the most advanced skills. Today, through MBDA, its centres of excellence shared between the two nations and its subcontractors, the Franco-British industry has the skills necessary to be able to achieve this development in accordance with the planned timetable.
The design and development of new-generation missiles requires specific skills, in some cases held by a very small number of people. As industry players often point out, these skills take a long time to gain, but only a short time to lose. As mentioned in Chapter Three, a failure to proceed with the programme would thus pose significant challenges to MBDA’s industrial and skills base. In Paris, Chris Allam spoke of the potential implications for MBDA if the FC/ASW were not to proceed :
…we would put at risk the skill we have developed in European missile design. This is one of the core programmes. It is not the only one—MBDA has a number of programmes—but it is absolutely at the core. In the same way that Storm Shadow and SCALP were at the core of MBDA to start, this is at the core of MBDA as we go forward ([139]).
However, should the development phase proceed successfully after 2020, another important consideration will be the industrial sharing between both countries and between the different industrial players in the sector.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the characteristics of the concept ultimately adopted will play a key role in determining how the workload of the FC/ASW programme should be distributed: British industrialists have real expertise in the field of stealth, while French players have greater experience when it comes to hyper-velocity.
In this regard, it should be reiterated that the choice of a missile family could resolve a number of issues. For instance, if the decision were made to favour increasing the length of the extension over the ability to conduct deep strike, which implies losing speed, a subsonic stealth solution could be considered for the future airborne cruise missile. In contrast, a supersonic solution could be preferred for the ability to strike against ships and remove air defences. As a result, the British and French players would each be mobilised on a “propulsion” sub-set, thereby enabling sharing on the other segment: the “navigation-guidance” sub-set.
In this regard, while MBDA UK has definite expertise, as evidenced by its designing the homing system for Common Anti-air Modular Missile [CAMM] ground-to-air missiles, Thales Group holds a leading position on homing systems, whether a passive homing system such as the one that equips the MICA air-to-air and surface-to-air missile deployed on Rafale and Mirage 2000 aircraft, or products using an active antenna, like the 4A that will equip the MICA NG (new generation) missile. Here too, it will be necessary to ensure that the entire industrial chain is involved, in order to preserve skills and, in so doing, industrial autonomy and sovereign capabilities.
V. Reducing costs, stepping up our influence
A. Burden sharing
Financial burden-sharing is closely intertwined with the MBDA's organisational principles, as defined by the Lancaster House agreement. The creation of centres of excellence should make it possible to achieve significant economies of scale.
Furthermore, the joint financing of the programme should ensure that cost of further development would also be shared between the two countries, a factor that is significant in the current public finance context.
In theory, a programme run in cooperation should incur lower unit costs, thus enabling an increase in the number of orders. The benefits of this “serial effect” would be even greater if the program were extended to other countries.
For the time being, while such an assumption is not guaranteed, Joël Barre indicated at his hearing in Paris that “other countries may decide to become involved" ([140]). Antoine Bouvier believed that, for MBDA,“this programme of deep and anti-ship strikes is an excellent example [of a programme that could attract wider international participation] because we are starting from a Franco-British scope but the objective further down the line, when we reach the right level of maturity, is to extend that programme to other European countries that have cruise missiles [Sweden, Germany, Italy, Spain]” ([141]). It could well be that the FC/ASW is ultimately destined, for its deep strike capacity, to replace the SCALP EG operated by Italian forces, and the TAURUS KEPD 350 missile operated by the German, Swedish and Spanish forces.
In any case, the programme's economic balance will also depend on its success on the export market. Moreover, in the case of the EG/Storm Shadow SCALP, it was indeed export that made it possible to increase the serial effect and to return, “in terms of series produced, American orders of magnitude instead of the usual 10 per cent" ([142]).
B. Export
Designing a product intended solely for the Franco-British market could prove to be a mistake in several respects:
– as a result of such a decision, series manufacturing times might be spread over longer periods to maintain skills in the industry, and this might raise questions as to how relevant the weapon will be in the medium-term and whether its definition should remain unchanged when signs of obsolescence are emerging;
– the decision would also have a direct impact on the unit cost of the systems since non-recurring development and industrialisation costs would be spread over smaller quantities;
– the decision would limit both countries’ international influence: weapons sales remain an important diplomatic tool and are part of the development of strategic partnerships.
Export potential is therefore a key factor in reducing costs, ensuring the programme's economic balance and contributing to both countries’ influence. Moreover, in London, Guto Bebb emphasised that, in his view, “export was an important issue”, reiterating in passing that one of the reasons behind MBDA’s success was its export capacity ([143]). In that regard it is worth remembering that the SCALP/Storm Shadow was also "designed for export" ([144]). Of course, it will be important to remain watchful regarding the identity of the acquiring countries, as implied when, during his hearing in Paris, Joël Barre stressed there could be no efficient cooperation between France and the United Kingdom on any given weapons system "unless we agree on common rules for exportability" ([145]).
The capacity to export the FC/ASW is all the more essential as the missile would be marketed at the same time as a platform, the export of which was deemed to be “crucial” by Mr Bebb. It is difficult to offer an aircraft or vessel for sale without a weapon system, as the export of air and naval platforms requires proficiency in the weapons with which they are equipped. The exportability of future missiles is thus essential toward exporting the platforms which they will equip. In this context, the capability of future missiles will also be a powerful consideration when France and the United Kingdom respond to foreign tenders. Addressing the Parliamentarians, Antoine Bouvier stated in Paris that: “Performance is really about the performance of the whole weapons system and the platform—it is the two together that can really deliver a satisfactory performance” ([146]).
Generally speaking, there are two broad groups of countries to which export should be possible. First, the circle of European countries which, in the absence of an extension of the programme, could naturally be interested in acquiring FC/ASW. Secondly, other countries are likely to be attracted by the very high-performance equipment offered, such as happened in the case METEOR.
In order to come to an agreement on the rules for missile export, the SGDSN and the British Ministry of Defence regularly exchange views within the One-MBDA Governance Committee. This process has made it possible to harmonise "white lists", identifying product-recipient relationships for which export does not in principle pose any problem, in principle, for the two States. With regard to FC/ASW, it is too early to say whether the question of its exportability will be addressed within the context of these white lists connected with the One-MBDA initiative, or whether it will be covered by a distinct Franco-British agreement ([147]). In any event, this question will need to be clarified prior to any decision on FC/ASW, and the final decision to export will always be made on a case-by-case basis.
The FC/ASW will still need to be able to go head-to-head with MBDA’s main competitors. In Europe, the Norwegian group Konsberg, in partnership with Raytheon, is a serious competitor thanks to its Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike Missile products. Nevertheless, within the Western bloc, the American players are the most prominent competitors.
It will therefore be essential to anticipate the effects of certain regulations that could limit our ability to export such products, and in particular the USA's international traffic in arms regulations (ITAR) ([148]). These regulations control the import and export of defence-related items and services as listed on the United States Munitions List (USML). These regulations cover not only complete platforms, but also individual components, with significant implications for third parties.
In this area, both countries might benefit from the experience of the SCALP/Storm Shadow programme. The study by the French think-tank Foundation for Strategic Research, stressed that “the preference for autonomy and the desire to export the missile meant that European solutions were preferred to avoid ITAR constraints” ([149]). Nonetheless, it did not prevent, a few months ago, the US Government from using the ITAR regulations to block the export of SCALP missiles from France to Egypt as a result of SCALP missiles containing US-manufactured components ([150]). Anticipating the effects of the ITAR regulations and, more broadly, any potential hindrance to the export of these materials will be essential for the FC/ASW programme. We recommend that, as part of the concept phase, both countries and MBDA explore the potential impact of the ITAR regulations on the FC/ASW programme and in doing so ensure that lessons are learnt from past experiences, such as the recent aborted SCALP export to Egypt.
General conclusions
It is important to bear in mind that the concept phase still leaves the UK and French authorities with the best part of two years to reach an agreement on the continuation of the FC/ASW programme. We are, therefore, still at the beginning of the process, and there still remains time to refine the expectations and demands of the political and military authorities, both nationally and jointly.
It is nevertheless essential to realise that the FC/ASW may not succeed and to be aware of the potential consequences of such a failure. Should the FC/ASW programme not proceed after the concept phase concludes in 2020, either for technological or cost reasons, there could be significant consequences for UK-French cooperation and to the unique industrial partnership and skills bases that have emerged in both countries via MBDA. The strengthening of the Franco-British industrial and technological defence base, through the increasingly extensive integration of MBDA, has been one of the pillars of the Lancaster House agreement.
However, such a scenario need not materialise. We are hopeful that both parties will work to achieve a successful outcome to the concept phase. The concept phase is, as mentioned above, still relatively young and it is clear that good progress has been made to date. While there are key issues that both parties need to resolve, we are certain that they can be resolved amicably and successfully. As Sir Simon Bollom pointed out in London, France and the United Kingdom have a very mature relationship built over the years and based entirely on compromise. This joint inquiry has been a testament to this strong and pragmatic relationship and is a mark of our interest in its continuing success.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 :
CONTRIBUTIONS received by the british house of commons
For a comprehensive list of the written evidence sent to the House of Commons’ Defence committee on this topic, see: House of Commons, Future anti-ship missile system inquiry - publications.
APPENDIX 2 :
oral evidence on WEDNESDAY july the 11TH 2018
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 11 Jul 2018.
Watch the meeting
Members present: Dr Julian Lewis (Chair); Jean-Pierre Cubertafon; Jean-Jacques Ferrara; Mr Mark Francois; Jean-Charles Larsonneur; Mrs Madeleine Moon; Natalia Pouzyreff; Gavin Robinson; Ruth Smeeth; John Spellar; Stéphane Trompille; and Charles de La Verpillière.
Questions 1-54
Witnesses
I: Guto Bebb, Minister for Defence Procurement; Sir Simon Bollom, Chief Executive Officer for Defence Equipment and Support, Ministry of Defence; and Lieutenant General Sir Mark Poffley, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability).
Examination of witnesses
Witnesses: Guto Bebb, Sir Simon Bollom and Lieutenant General Sir Mark Poffley.
Q1 Chair: Good afternoon and welcome to today’s informal joint session between the House of Commons Defence Committee and the Assemblée nationale Standing Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces. This is part of our joint inquiry into anti-ship missiles. I believe it is the first time that a House of Commons Select Committee has taken evidence jointly with a Committee from a non-UK Parliament. I welcome our colleagues from the Assemblée nationale and our witnesses from the Ministry of Defence.
Before we begin, I would like to go through some quick housekeeping. First, I remind everyone that this is an informal meeting and, as such, the live proceedings of today’s meeting are not covered by parliamentary privilege. However, we will produce a transcript of today’s meeting that, once approved formally by the Committee, will be privileged. Secondly, this is a bilingual session and simultaneous translation is being provided. Thirdly, we are going to alternate between UK and French questions, although of course members of either Committee can intervene with additional questions during the session.
We must have an eye to the clock, because there is a shipbuilding debate later this afternoon that our Minister needs to attend, and many of us will want to participate in it as well. That debate will probably come after a vote at 4 o’clock or a little after, so we need to keep an eye on how fast we are going, so as to not squeeze out those colleagues who have not had a chance to ask a question or make an intervention. I ask colleagues to try to be concise in their questioning.
I would like to ask each of the three members of the panel to briefly introduce themselves. Lieutenant General Poffley, as it is your first appearance since you received your knighthood in the Queen’s birthday honours, we would like to congratulate you on that. Please start by introducing yourself.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Thank you very much, Chair. My name is General Mark Poffley and I am the senior officer responsible for delivering advice on the balance of investment for our military capability, so I sit somewhere between the DGA and the French MoD.
Guto Bebb: I am Guto Bebb, Minister for Defence Procurement.
Sir Simon Bollom: Good afternoon, Chair and Committee. I am Simon Bollom. I am the chief executive of Defence Equipment and Support, which is responsible for UK procurement and acquisition of equipment and support.
Chair: For the benefit of anyone who does not speak French, channel 1 allows you to hear in English everything that is said, and channel 2 gives you the other option. John Spellar will start us off.
Q2 John Spellar: Minister, may I start this really quite historic hearing by asking how important you would say the UK-France defence relationship is?
Guto Bebb: From our perspective, obviously, the relationship with the French MoD and the French military has been very important for decades. I think it is fair to say that France and the United Kingdom are the two powers in Europe capable of having a global reach.
The extent of our co-operation across the board has deepened significantly over recent years. We have seen joint operations, British warships protect the Charles de Gaulle, French warships protect Albion on missions, and of course there was the recent deployment in the Sahel. There is a strong long-term relationship, which certainly is important to us, and I think that will be the case moving forward as well.
Q3 John Spellar: That is the importance on the military side, which is often not so well understood. What benefits or consequences would you say that co-operation, and bilateral co-operation on equipment and capabilities, has produced for our industrial bases in the UK and France? Does it mean that our platforms are more interoperable?
Guto Bebb: We are doing such an amount of work on missile systems because of the success of MBDA, which is a joint UK-French enterprise but involves other partner nations, too. Its success is highlighted by platforms such as ASRAAM, SPEAR Cap 3, Storm Shadow and so forth, all technologically advanced systems that have been very successfully deployed and have also been successful in export markets.[1]
In terms of industrial capability, MBDA employs about 10,000 people in total, and it could be argued that a significant element of its success on a worldwide basis has been built on the relationships that we have on an MoD-to-MoD basis.
Further, there has been a significant amount of co-operation on the nuclear programme, which can be highlighted by some of the research capabilities we are developing together, Teutates being one example. Again, that is an opportunity to see where we can work together to provide research capability more cost-effectively than if we did so on a nation-by-nation basis. That is a long-standing collaboration, which obviously builds on the military-to-military relationships we have but also provides a significant industrial benefit, competitiveness and technological solutions to some of the needs that we have in our two Armed Forces.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I would endorse every word of that. I have noticed a considerable change in our relationship even in the course of the last five years. It has become increasingly close, in terms of both understanding threat profiles and then being able to translate that back into military capability. Certainly, I have seen with both the EMA and the DGA a very close relationship with us here in the UK MoD, which is encouraging. We have increasingly been sharing data. Indeed, that is an active line of our inquiry going forward—sharing even the most sensitive of information.
Q4 Chair: Have any of you benefited in any way from this closer co-operation with France in terms of the fact that, although France spends a lower proportion of GDP on defence than we do, it seems to get rather more in equipment out of its defence budget than we get out of ours? Are there any helpful lessons we have been able to learn from our French colleagues about how to get the maximum output of equipment in return for the money we invest?
Guto Bebb: That is an interesting question. As part of our relationship, we have regular bilateral meetings where lessons learned are shared between MoD and French officials. Whether we have seen any clear signs of advantage being taken from those lessons learned is still to be considered in the fullness of time. But there is no doubt to my view that the extent of the information sharing is significant.
For example, one of the things that I have seen as a significant pointer to the depth of the relationship is the way in which the modernisation and transformation profile and programme at the DE&S has been taken seriously and looked at very closely by our French counterparts.
Sometimes there are lessons from France that we can certainly learn from. You highlighted a significant issue that we should take very seriously. In the same way, the transformation programmes that we have been undertaking within elements of our procurement processes are also being looked at by our French colleagues.
Q5 Chair: Sir Simon, would people in your organisation be actively looking to the French to see whether we can gain from their very effective way of producing a great deal of equipment on a more limited defence budget?
Sir Simon Bollom: Yes, indeed. If you look back over recent history and programmes such as the ones we will discuss today on the missiles side—A400M and going as far back as the Jaguar aircraft—we have been traditional allies in terms of co-operation in procurement. One of the interesting things about going through these sorts of processes is to compare our processes. We work very closely with the DGA at every level. I think it is one of the closest co-operations that we have with our allies.
Chair: On that encouraging note, I turn to Natalia.
Q6 Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you. I want to turn to the co-operation at hand—the future of the anti-ship missile system. You say that the French and British forces share the position on threats and operational needs for 2030. Are French and British needs aligned? According to your evaluations of that threat, have you planned to budget for and finance the capacity you will need to respond to that threat?
Guto Bebb: I will have to respond in English, as regrettably I am not able to respond in French.
On capabilities we are looking at, we have launched the concept phase for this programme. The concept phase offers real opportunities for us to learn and to benefit from each other, because we have a requirement in the United Kingdom to replace Harpoon and Storm Shadow, while, obviously, our French counterparts need to replace Exocet and SCALP. So we have similar requirements moving forward.
It has to be said that this is quite unique because I do not think we have seen the MoD in this country co-ordinate a process of research at such an early stage before. The fact that we are going in at concept stage and we are funding that concept stage for a three-year period means that the opportunity is there to ensure that we come up with responses to the needs we have in the United Kingdom and the needs of the French for their requirements.
We can co-ordinate that in a way that is coherent and that we genuinely hope will provide added value to both countries. But because it is a concept phase, we are not risking huge amounts of money at this point in time. If, at the end of the concept phase, we find ourselves in a situation where the analyses of the needs and solutions between the two countries are different, we will have the ability to separate at that point. Our own position is that the indications are that this programme is on time, on budget and is providing real value for both countries.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: To answer your threat question, from our point of view we share exactly the same ideas about the threat as far as we can. One needs to be careful because this particular series of programmes is looking at a threat profile from 2030 onwards, potentially as far as 2060. We are trying to make sure that in this concept phase we do not overprescribe and become guilty of delivering a platform that is out of date at the point at which you want to introduce it. The notion of things like open architecture becomes quite important. Your ability to add and subtract to that baseline is going to be an important dynamic.
To reassure both Committees, there is a very active engagement about the levels of threat and where we would see weapons of this type being used, and it is at the most sensitive levels. I don’t think there is anything that is not shared between us.
Your second question referred to money. We have a programmed line over and above the concept phase, certainly here in the United Kingdom. Its attribution will obviously be dependent on where we get to at the back end of the concept phase in due course. We have made no judgments yet as to the scale and size of that attribution at this juncture.
Q7 Mrs Moon: Very soon we will be at the halfway stage of the concept phase. What progress has been made on that phase and is it still on track to conclude by 2020? Do you see that as feasible?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: First, very good progress has been made. We are due to conduct a further review at the back end of this year[2], and then we will have a more substantive key review in early ’19, which will assess the judgments made to date. The phase to date has been essentially an evidence-gathering phase, and that is why I can give confidence to the previous question. It has looked at a number of technical investigations, but those have yet to conclude.
We will need to do more on that as we get to the latter part of the concept phase. It is in the process of gathering evidence from both the DE&S and the DGA about the industrial bases that would support such a procurement. The next phase is about how we now describe our arrangement in some form of memorandum of understanding, which might cover workshare and all of the technical procurement details in due course. So we are on schedule to deliver the results that we anticipated at the back end of next year.
Q8 Mrs Moon: So you are clearly monitoring. Are you monitoring in conjunction with your French counterparts?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Absolutely. It is part of a completely collaborative programme.
Sir Simon Bollom: There is a joint piece of governance, so there are regular programme reviews and we share share their DGA/DE&S reviews with the capability sponsor. We are keeping a tight control over deliverables and the analysis process.
Q9 Mrs Moon: Minister, I feel you want to come in.
Guto Bebb: I was going to say that one of my first foreign visits was to do one of these regular catch-ups between the French officials and ourselves, so it is a regular event.
Q10 Mrs Moon: Thank you. At this stage, do you envisage that the requirements can be met by a single missile system with two variants of the same basic airframe, or are we going to have two distinct weapons? Is it one weapon/two variants or two distinct weapons? Where do you see us going? Have you any idea yet or is it too early to decide?
Guto Bebb: It would be fair to say that at this point in time we are into the first year of the concept phase, but it is too early to say whether a final decision is being made. The key thing is that both countries have a clear idea of what they need from this programme.
We are trying to ensure that we provide a response to the questions that we are asking, which will be coherent and providing the value for money that is increasingly important to both nations. Even as we see the defence budget in both France and the United Kingdom increasing, the demand for getting value for that investment is also increasingly important.
Q11 Mrs Moon: Which is going to be of more importance? Are we going to have a priority for the anti-ship capability or the DeepStrike missile? Which is the priority? Or are they of equal priority?
Sir Simon Bollom: At the moment, they are of equal priority. What we have got here is quite a broad capability set. In one, the target is a ship, and the other will be a long-range strike capability, probably against very protected targets. We might not have a single solution for that wide diversity of threats, to meet those different targets, but the other benefit of this programme is the modularity of the capability.
We might, for example, have two solutions here, and at the moment, we have—we’ve got SCALP/Storm Shadow versus Harpoon in the UK, and Exocet. But what we want to be able to do is to develop technology once and use it many times, so at this early-concept stage, it’s a case of looking at which technologies we need to exploit and making them reusable.
Q12 Chair: You have mentioned several different weapon systems. One weapon system that is quite widely deployed in the Royal Navy at the moment is the Tomahawk cruise missiles. Is it anticipated that the new joint system that you are trying to develop will take on some of the role that the Tomahawk takes on, and if so, what sort of gaps are we looking at between the loss of Harpoon and Tomahawk, for example, and the introduction of the new system, or will we be able to avoid gaps completely?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Certainly we would anticipate the sorts of roles that Tomahawk is providing at the moment being catered for inside the requirement here.[3] I think it’s too early to say about gaps, because as we get further into the concept phase, particularly on the technical details, there will be some technologies that we think we may be able to introduce earlier.
Indeed, there may be options for us to take off existing weapon systems, to ameliorate any in-service or out-of-service dates. So at the moment, we are not in a position to say that we are going to treat any potential gaps—they are only potential gaps at the moment—with this programme. We are going to have a look at exactly what else is on the market and then attend to the problem as it arises.
Q13 Chair: Are you looking at the developments that possible adversaries are making? We constantly hear about threats to the future carriers from Chinese anti-ship missiles, for example. Is that being fully taken into account in the design of what we are hoping to produce to cover what seems to be a very wide range of missile capabilities?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Sure, but these weapons will not be configured, or at least we don’t have an ambition for them, at this stage, to be in an anti-missile role. We quite clearly are looking at what is extant in terms of technology or missiles of this type today, including those of some of our potential adversaries, and those are being factored into the assessments that we are making here about whether something is going to be an appropriate technology to take forward in the 2030 timeframe.
Chair: Anyone else? No? Okay, Charles.
Q14 Charles de La Verpillière (Translation): Thank you, Chair. I have two questions, which are political and quite general questions. The first is about the budgets and the plans. The French Parliament has just adopted a military plan for 2019 to 2025, and I believe that the British Government and Parliament are also working on plans to the mid-term. Could you tell us what the first indications are, for now, in terms of mid-term budget planning? My second question is also general and political. Do you think that the current Brexit context may have an influence on a bilateral programme such as the one we are talking about today?
Guto Bebb: Thank you very much for those questions. May I say, from our perspective, that we welcome the fact that the French Government have announced a significant increase in defence funding? I am sure that will be welcomed at the NATO conference as well.
The context of the UK defence budget is that we currently have a budget of around £36.5 billion, which as Committee members from the United Kingdom are aware, is increasing by 0.5% above inflation every year. We have an equipment budget that is worth approximately £180 billion. Those are the top-line figures.
However, I think the key thing is that, in the period from 2015 until 2018, it has become very apparent that some of the challenges and threats that we face have changed, which is why the Secretary of State for Defence announced his Modernising Defence programme back in early February or late January.
The aim of the Modernising Defence programme is not to say that a specific percentage of GDP should be spent on Defence—there are obviously Members who have strong views as to how much we should spend on Defence—but to acknowledge the extent of the budget that we provide for defence and to say that the Government have a responsibility to ensure that we identify the threats that we face and the capabilities that we need to respond to those threats. I think the Secretary of State said on Monday that the top-line findings on the Modernising Defence programme should be available before recess.
The process and the discussion within Government on the Modernising Defence programme will continue, and I suspect that it will not be before the autumn until we see the final results of the programme in detail. It is important to stress that the MDP is happening within the context of what is both a protected and an expanding defence budget, in terms of the money made available. However, there is no doubt that the demands made on our defence budget are also significant, as a result of the changing threat environments.
In terms of Brexit, you make an incredibly important point about the importance of bilateral relationships moving forward. There is no doubt that we want to be involved in some European projects and initiatives after Brexit. However, we also feel that some of the strong relationships we have with European partners are obviously based on our membership of NATO and on bilateral relationships that have often paid dividends. For example, we are very proud that the Eurofighter Typhoon is acknowledged as a very capable platform. That was developed in association, on a bilateral basis, with other partners in Europe. In the same way, the A400M, which Sir Simon touched on, is also an incredibly capable platform, and any RAF pilot will be very complimentary about its capabilities. Again, that was created on a bilateral basis with partners.
Our view is that there initiatives within Europe—the European Defence Fund is an example—that the United Kingdom would certainly prefer to be involved in moving forward. Some of the definitions made by the Commission of what would be described as a third-country participation agreement are currently not acceptable to the United Kingdom.
However, owing to the openness of the United Kingdom’s defence markets and our contribution to both NATO and the defence of Europe, we feel that there are significant opportunities for us to carry on having a significant relationship with our European partners, both in co-operating on some of these EU projects moving forward and strongly developing our bilateral relationships, which we have and which we take very seriously and respect immensely.
Chair: Does anyone have anything to add?
Charles de La Verpillière (Translation): No. Just to say that we wish for the same—to follow up on these European and bilateral projects. We would like to carry on.
Q15 Ruth Smeeth: Good afternoon, gentlemen. Following on from Madeleine’s questions earlier, will British and French operational requirements be sufficiently aligned to allow common development and procurement?
Guto Bebb: You are absolutely right to ask that question. That is one of the reasons why we are doing a concept phase. I think that we have similar requirements moving forward, but the whole point of doing this in a staged manner, where we have an initial three-year concept phase, is to make sure that we come up with a response to the similar challenges that we face.
The key thing we are trying to do is to make sure that, as we go through the concept phase, we look at issues that will be very important to any platform developed by the United Kingdom or France if we decide to go our separate ways. I do not think that is where we will go, but, for example, we will look at the ability to have a missile which can track sufficiently and can defend itself, and we will look at the accuracy of a missile and so forth, because those will be very similar and important to both a French and a UK solution.
The aim of the concept phase is to put as much research and effort as we can into what will be of common use to both France and the United Kingdom. We will preferably end up with a common solution, but I stress again—I apologise for sounding like a stuck record—that we are in the first year of a concept phase that will last for three years. I still think it is too early to say whether we will end up with a single platform or more than one.
Q16 Ruth Smeeth: Picking up on what you just said, Minister, will the concept phase use MBDA’s previous work on Perseus?
Guto Bebb: MBDA is certainly involved in the concept phase from the outset, yes.
Sir Simon Bollom: When kicking off on collaborative programmes such as this, ideally, at the end of it, both parties will have exactly the same view on the threat and the solution. The reality is that 100% overlap is unlikely. Of course, what you get through a collaboration is a sharing of the up-front costs. We have a very mature relationship with the French, developed over the years, and it is about compromise.
Q17 Ruth Smeeth: So we may end up with a variant of a common programme.
Sir Simon Bollom: We might do, but both parties would want to be as common as possible, recognising the benefit in one-off cost of sharing as much as we can.
Q18 Ruth Smeeth: What are the respective range requirements for DeepStrike and anti-ship?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: We have got indicative ideas as to ranges, and obviously they need to replicate the weapons systems in play currently with both us and the French. It would be an interesting commentary to suggest that I am going to pick a particular range, but at their longest ranges, we are talking about thousands of kilometres, and at their shortest, we are talking in tens of kilometres. It needs to sit somewhere in between there.
There will be some judgments to be taken about what the effect is, because this is about the type of flight and the weight characteristics of the weapon, which will play fundamentally into those range options. So we have not set a precise range; we have given them a band, and it falls into the broad category I have given you there.
Q19 Ruth Smeeth: In terms of the requirements you have put forward, is one for an air-launched standoff anti-ship missile, or are we also looking at long-range surface-launched missiles receiving targeting information from airborne platforms like the F-35?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: From a UK point of view, we are looking at a precision strike weapon from our combat aircraft and a surface-to-surface, and indeed a surface to precision in depth on the land, weapon from the maritime component.
Q20 Ruth Smeeth: Are we also looking at a submarine variant?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Not precisely in this programme. There will undoubtedly be potentially some read-across of some of the work done in this programme to other missile systems.
Q21 Chair: It does seem to look, though, as if we are talking about a single concept which will have to cover everything from relatively short, to medium range, to very deep strike indeed. Doesn’t that naturally point in the direction of having two separate systems? Otherwise, one will waste an awful lot of long-range capacity using something on a short-to-medium-range mission.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I think it may well do. That is one of the things that, as we get to the end of the concept phase, certainly by 2020, we would need to make a judgment about. But it is quite clear that we need to service two requirements from both national perspectives. That is where the choice comes, and that is what the conclusions of the concept phase will draw out.
Sir Simon Bollom: I might add as well that if one of them is an air-launched requirement and the other is a ship-launched requirement, there will be specific things that that capability will have to have for both environments. So inevitably you will have two variants, even if we can get it down to a single missile.
Q22 Jean-Pierre Cubertafon (Translation): Minister, I have an important question that encapsulates the generation of anti-ship missiles. Since the ratification of the Lancaster House treaties in 2010, the common development project for matériel has represented an important advance in Franco-British co-operation. It is the first time that our two nations have agreed to co-operate in weapons development and to undertake missions together in a single programme.
However, with Brexit being negotiated we need to consolidate a new legal framework to allow for future programmes and our relationship to continue. Is a new intergovernmental agreement possible? Can the Lancaster House treaties be the starting point for that? Are you afraid that some post-Brexit agreement may not allow the Franco-British military project to continue? Could the project, wanted by both, be torpedoed by that, for example?
Guto Bebb: From our perspective, the agreement in 2010 is considered to be an important agreement. We were very pleased with the outcome of the Sandhurst summit in January 2018, where there was a significant amount of agreement once again between France and the United Kingdom. For example, the willingness of the United Kingdom to deploy troops to the Sahel—helicopter support to the Sahel—was as a result of the Sandhurst summit.
Obviously, we were very pleased that France agreed to rejoin the UK-led NATO enhanced forward presence in Estonia. We had a number of other agreements and issues that were agreed at Sandhurst. That was in January 2018, so I would argue that Brexit is a challenge that we have to be aware of moving forward, but that the bilateral relationship that we have had with France from a military perspective is very long standing.
The key issue for us is to ensure that there is value delivered to both France and the United Kingdom from a continued bilateral relationship moving forward. I have already touched on the fact that there are EU initiatives in the sphere of defence, not least in terms of research, which we think the United Kingdom should be involved with.
I refer you to the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich when she highlighted what she wanted to see in terms of our future defence and security co-operation with the European Union. That was a very constructive speech, highlighting the role that we perceived that the United Kingdom could still have in terms of the security and defence of Europe.
I go back to the fact that in January we did have a summit that was successful. We did have a summit that agreed a number of new proposals moving forward. From a personal point of view, I was also pleased to be in Malaysia during the Easter period, when a crew of Royal Navy personnel flew into the capital of Malaysia in a helicopter that had been deployed from a French warship, which highlights the fact that the co-operation that we have is ongoing and deep, and there is no reason that should not continue, despite the fact that the United Kingdom will be leaving the European Union next March.
Q23 Gavin Robinson: Good afternoon. I speak English, Minister. It may be a Northern Ireland dialect, but it is still English. I want to explore the exportability of whatever emerges from this conceptual case. Is it an important part? Is it something you are striving towards? Are you looking and assessing what market appetite or demand is? Ultimately, will that be an important factor in deciding what emerges from this process? Or is it a beneficial by-product, if you can achieve it?
Guto Bebb: I will respond and then Sir Simon and Mark can respond as well. I think the export issue is important. One of the successes of MBDA has been the capability in terms of export. Of course, we have other companies based in the United Kingdom that have also been very successful with the export of missiles to parts of the world. You would no doubt be aware of some of those companies.
In terms of export, obviously we are working within international treaty restrictions, but, from our perspective, as the work is being undertaken on this capability phase, we are also looking very clearly at how exports should be a part of that component, because the success of the development of our joint industrial base on this issue is dependent. It is not just ensuring that we have the right capability for both our militaries.
On the prosperity agenda, we had the Dunne review released on Monday, I believe. If you read the Dunne review, very clearly the contribution made to UK prosperity by MoD spend, not least by our ability to export some of our platforms, is crucial. From our perspective, we are certainly looking at the export potential of any platform that is developed as a result of the work that we are doing on the joint conception phase.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I would add a couple of comments to that, if I may. The first is that, from my perspective, we have to retain sovereign choice going forward. That, by extension, means that you need a vibrant industrial base from which to make those choices. That is the first point.
The second one is that, with weapons systems such as this, we would want to be interoperable with many nations that are close and dear to us. Therefore, that tends towards our wanting to ensure that there is certainly an export market, and that that can accommodate our ambitions for future alliances going forward, so there is a double incentive there for us to make sure we factor in very early the notion that this must contribute to the prosperity of both the United Kingdom and France.
Q24 Gavin Robinson: Thank you. Minister, you referred to MBDA and other companies. Have you explored the issues associated with MBDA being involved in the conceptual phase and any implications that that will have for a tendering process? Do you envisage there being an open competition at the conclusion of the conceptual process?
Guto Bebb: That is a fair question. From our perspective, obviously we are working with MBDA on this issue, but we are also well aware of the capacity that we have, and the capacity that we have with companies that are also based in France, in terms of missile capability. The United Kingdom’s default position is always to look at competition as the best option in ensuring value for money. As we move forward from the concept phase, we will certainly take into account the importance of ensuring that we retain the ability to procure in a manner that ensures value for money.
Q25 Gavin Robinson: And do you foresee no issues at this stage with the early inclusion of MBDA?
Sir Simon Bollom: Absolutely. In fact, that is very much part of the strategy. MBDA will be the prime contractor in this case through the concept phase, but we want to get as many ideas in from SMEs and other suppliers as possible. MBDA does not have a monopoly on all the technologies we would want to embody, so part of the concept phase will be about examining what technologies are out there and which companies hold them, and working up a procurement strategy, if we were to go forward with a major acquisition.
Q26 Jean-Charles Larsonneur (Translation): My question is about the capacity stoppage for the anti-ship system. Is it possible for the lifetime of the Harpoon missiles to go beyond 2020? Do you foresee a rupture in the anti-ship capacity? Can you envisage an alternative solution—for example, a step-by-step purchase?
Guto Bebb: That is one of our concerns moving forward. I will touch on it quickly, and I am sure I will be supported. Obviously, the Harpoon is currently in service until 2023, which leaves a capability gap. The key thing from our perspective is that we are looking at the possibility of extending Harpoon, but that looks very challenging. We are also looking at the wider market and at other ways in which we can ensure that co-operation with other nations will deal with the issue in question.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: There are a number of weapons systems in play that are already in service, both here in Europe and in the United States. We are looking at those things at the moment. There is another group of weapons that are entering service. There is some more work to do to assess their applicability to fill the gap that we envisage, if we are to stick to the timetable for the Harpoon weapon in its current form. There is a bit more work to be done. We have not made a decision at this stage about how we are going to address that conundrum, but we obviously need to do so in a relatively short period.
Q27 Jean-Charles Larsonneur (Translation): In the concept phase, are you considering the issue of re-exportation?
Guto Bebb: That is part of the concept phase. This is not dissimilar to the answer I gave to Mr Robinson. We are certainly of the view that the export capability of any platform developed is an important consideration, in terms of the work we do at the concept phase. As we develop a solution, which will hopefully respond to the needs of the United Kingdom and France, from an industrial capability perspective and a sovereign capability perspective, we see the potential for exports as important.
As part of the concept phase, we are also looking at other options. The United Kingdom is looking at some off-the-shelf options as part of our concept phase, because we think it is important to look at the potential of off-the-shelf solutions in addition to any developments we manage that are bespoke to the needs of both militaries. We are trying to have a coherent overview of all the options open to us, and obviously the off-the-shelf analysis also contributes to our thinking on the replacement of Harpoon.
Q28 Mr Francois: Good afternoon, gentlemen. Minister, if I heard you right, you said that the current plan is to extend Harpoon out to 2023, but that to extend it further than that is pretty challenging. Can you give us a brief idea of why that is?
Guto Bebb: From a capability perspective I will defer to Sir Simon on that.
Sir Simon Bollom: The biggest challenges with this weapons system are the energetics, the propulsion system and the warhead. Here we come to difficult issues with finite lives and, clearly, its chemical compounds. Our assessment at this stage is that going beyond 2023 would be a challenge.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Could I perhaps add one flavour to that? That is absolutely the case. There is a danger that you look at Harpoon and the issue of whether there is a gap or not, and imagine that it has to be filled by a Harpoon-type weapon, but none of these weapons sits in isolation. They sit inside an ecosystem about which various compromises will undoubtedly be made.
When we look at the potential of a gap in the Harpoon and the surface-to-surface missile of the future, we are looking at it in the context of what other systems could come in and replicate the sorts of effect on targets that we might have hit with a Harpoon weapon. As I said earlier, that means that we have to look at other weapons systems that are currently available, or shortly about to enter service, as a matter of some urgency. Of course, we will then make that in compromise with other weapons systems that both ships and—dare I say it?—air platforms are likely to able to bring to bear in the battle space that we are worrying about.
Q29 Mr Francois: Do you regard Sea Venom as one of those?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I think Sea Venom is definitely one of those, as is Sea Skua[4].
Q30 Mr Francois: As I understand it, Sea Venom is helicopter launched.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Correct.
Q31 Mr Francois: So you are not going to have a surface-to-surface weapon as it were “directly based on the ship”?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Correct.
Q32 Mr Francois: Unless you decide to go for an off-the-shelf procurement?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Correct.
Q33 Mr Francois: Do you have an allocation in the equipment plan for an off-the-shelf procured surface-to-surface weapon?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: We have financial provision inside the equipment programme that is currently scored against that weapon system, and whatever we are going to do into the future. The size and shape of that is obviously under debate. We must, first, complete the assessment phase of the programmes we are talking about here, and also we must then look at what our requirements will be relative to the threat that we imagine in that 2023 period onwards.
Q34 Mr Francois: Okay, I have got that, Sir Mark, but to be clear, Sea Venom is obviously funded and is in the equipment programme. We know that, but, sorry, I want to press you a bit on that answer. You have some provision in the equipment right at the back end of the equipment plan for this new programme, but within the 10 hard years of the equipment plan, do you have a “replacement surface-to-surface missile” line item?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: We do not have a line item, but we are aware of that and it is in our minds when we look at the contingency inside the equipment programme.
Q35 Mr Francois: Okay, but at the moment that is not funded?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Not at this stage. Not directly against a line that is configured—
Q36 Mr Francois: You understand why I was trying to get an answer—
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Indeed so.
Q37 Mr Francois: Which, thank you, you have given. Are you not therefore concerned that, other than Sea Venom, the Royal Navy will not have a surface-to-surface weapon, other than the 4.5 inch gun?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I am indeed concerned, which is why we are looking at those alternatives, and why it is a high priority inside our programme considerations going forward.
Q38 Mr Francois: With respect—I am not giving away the Trident codes if I say this—the equipment programme is already heavily over-programmed at the moment. In the context of a heavily over-programmed equipment plan, are you saying that you realise there is a need, but there is no line item?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: At the moment we need to find provision for it, and we have yet to have established which part of the contingent pool that we have got inside the programme would be assigned to it, relative to other priorities that sit there, so there is a decision to be taken, yes.
Q39 Mr Francois: Do you think that decision might come as part of the Modernising Defence programme?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: It is part of our aspirations for the Modernising Defence programme.
Q40 Mr Francois: So it’s an aspiration?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: We know we would like a surface-to-surface weapon. We have got some choices to make about where it might come from, and we know there is a lot of pressure on the rest of the budget. That is the debate that is under way at the moment with the Treasury.
Q41 Mr Francois: Last one. What are the off-the-shelf options that you are looking at, should you decide that you actually have to fund that within the programme?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: You have some choices at the moment. One is a Block II version of Harpoon, which quite clearly is there. There is the RBS15 system, which is produced by Saab. There is obviously an Exocet Block III version that you could use, or there is the Otomat, which I think is MBDA Italia. That is what is available now.
There are a series of systems currently entering service: the naval strike missile, which is essentially a Raytheon missile[5] with some connections into Kongsberg in Norway; the maritime strike Tomahawk, which we talked about earlier, with Raytheon; and the long-range anti-ship missile produced by Lockheed Martin.
Q42 Mr Francois: In other words, if you decided that this was a sufficiently high priority to be funded, in the short term you have got plenty of choice.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: We have got routes. It is an issue of assigning money to those priorities.
Q43 Chair: Before we leave the Harpoon completely, can you tell us a bit more about Block II? That is a newer version of Harpoon, by the sound of it. And am I right in thinking that there is a variant of Harpoon that will be on the maritime patrol aircraft? Is that correct?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I’m not aware of the details behind Block II in terms of technical detail, so we would need to come back to you.[6] I don’t know whether Simon knows that.
Sir Simon Bollom: I’m afraid I don’t.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: And I am not aware of whether there is the ability to load that on to a maritime patrol aircraft. I know the French have an ambition, inevitably, to do so with some of their weapons systems, and it is a natural thought that you would want a maritime patrol aircraft.
Q44 Chair: Given that we appear to be in the business of trying to have the most versatile type of airframe and that we have brought back maritime patrol aircraft after a very unfortunate gap in that capability, it would seem that that would be an important part of the overall jigsaw picture.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: It is certainly something that will be considered very strongly.
Q45 Jean-Jacques Ferrara (Translation): Two big concepts are currently envisaged for the anti-ship missile Sea Venom. The first is a furtive subsonic missile, and the second is a rapid supersonic missile. So it is a choice between stealth and velocity. Are we going to opt for one of these concepts, or do we envisage a new family of missiles with all the advantages of such a solution?
For example, we were going to be able to adjust the calendar for the different capacities and to benefit the several domains of expertise for the relevant countries. France, for example, is more expert at hypervelocity. I will not give you the full details about that. There is a mutual dependency between the two countries with the consequence that we would have the integration of the future missile among our platforms. I know that you are an aviation man, but is this missile to be integrated—the F-35 with the Typhoon—and what are the constraints at the moment with the F-35?
Sir Simon Bollom: Thank you. There are a lot of points to cover there. In terms of the concepts we are exploring, as my colleague, Sir Mark, has mentioned, there is a wide range of capabilities, long-range penetration, and the potential short-range engagement ship to ship. Supersonics is definitely something that we are looking at already.
We very much acknowledge that France has some excellent technologies in that area. That is one strength of the partnership. In terms of long-range strike, if we are talking about distances, which Sir Mark has mentioned, a very fast supersonic missile over those distances is possibly not a solution. There we would be looking at other alternative concepts. Low-observability and ability to penetrate enemy airspace without detection is another set of capability suites. Clearly the UK has a number of technologies that we could bring to bear there. For me, this underpins how good a collaboration this is, in terms of complimentary capabilities.
In terms of the F-35, we do plan to integrate the missile on to the F-35 in the future as SPEAR Cap 5. . That is a long way off. At the moment, I would call it a place-marker in the weapons integration plan. Certainly, the F-35 integration of this solution is something we desire to do.
Q46 Stéphane Trompille (Translation): Regarding the main evolution that you are expecting at the moment on the future generations of missiles, what precisely are you expecting regarding the question that my colleague Jean-Jacques Ferrara asked? Have you already had a few points on which you would like to be asked, such as being furtive or hyper-speed? Also, for you, what would be the maximum range for the Royal Navy in the case of a rupture of capacity, to come back on what Jean-Charles Larsonneur has said? Also, do you think that, at the moment, regarding the range of missile that you currently have, this armament can answer your operational needs beyond 2030?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I think Sir Simon has mentioned integration on to aircraft, so I won’t dwell on that. We are actively having a conversation with our French colleagues about fifth and fourth-generation fighters. I hope that will give you some reassurance that that conversation is a rich one and progressing well. Regarding the ship variant, I mentioned earlier the sort of ranges we are talking about. It must meet pretty much where we are with Harpoon and Exocet Block II.
We would aspire for it to potentially go further. As I said earlier, we have not set a range for that at the moment. We have asked for the technical information to come back, to give us a feel for what is in the art of the possible, but we are talking about thousands of kilometres. From that point of view, it gives us choice downstream.
Again, there are a number of trade-offs to be made here. We have talked about hypersonics versus the ability to go a long way. Those are not necessarily compatible, given the technologies as they exist today. In the discussions we are having we will look to explore whether that will change.
Q47 Stéphane Trompille (Translation): I also wanted to know what you need. In France, at the moment, we work a lot on artificial intelligence. I am not sure whether you have followed the latest work we have done, especially within the majority that we currently have. Is this a possible option? Could we start thinking about artificial intelligence for future missiles?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: It is absolutely the case that France is leading the UK in some sectors. The converse is also true: the UK is perhaps further ahead in others. The passage and the use of data from those weapon systems, both to the missile in flight and to be able to pre-programme them, will be a massively important part of the next generation of weapon systems.
It follows that our ability to handle data quickly, and artificial intelligence and automated data systems, will become quite important, not necessarily in the missiles themselves but in some of the feeder systems that will help to cue and target those weapons. As we have our broader capability dialogue with France, both those areas are strong elements of our discussions. A stream of work is going on inside those dialogues to see how we can collectively exploit not just the commercial market, but our technical experts in the military sector.
Guto Bebb: One of the strengths of the relationship that we have with France on this issue is that it is not confined. When we have regular meetings, we often take advantage of the opportunity to share experiences and to understand, for example, the types of issues that are being developed through the UK MoD’s innovation fund.
I cannot stress enough how open a relationship we have when we are looking at those capabilities. Of course, France and the United Kingdom have their red lines, but in terms of trying to provide an enhanced capability as a result of the co-operation, it develops a degree of co-operation that I would argue is remarkable.
Chair: Everyone has been so remarkably self-disciplined that, almost uniquely, we have the opportunity for further bids. I will maximise our hospitality to our French friends in particular, because I would like to give them the best opportunity to interrogate our specialist panel. Natalia, would you like to ask a further question?
Q48 Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you, Chair, and thank you, sirs. I wanted to mention the strategic autonomy question, which you mentioned already. When we consider strategic autonomy from one end to the other, we have intelligence, preparing for missions, and connectivity; we obviously have to master strike precision; and it also involves mastering key technologies and all the industrial skills and capacities that we need. Do you share the same vision as France on the fact that it is essential to master those capacities and skills from one end to the other to have full strategic autonomy?
Sir Simon Bollom: Madame, I absolutely accept the point on autonomy. Autonomous systems are proliferating everywhere. Fairly soon, we will have driverless cars on the road, I am sure. Autonomous air vehicles are very much in play as we speak, and we are looking at how much we can exploit those sorts of technologies—your colleagues have already mentioned artificial intelligence—in these systems.
We have to consider rules of engagement. Where we are launching lethal force, a high degree of assurance would clearly need to be placed on those autonomous capabilities. We are very much looking at what is out there in the industrial sector. The UK and France have some autonomous systems—ground, maritime and air—that we can exploit, but in taking those forward, we have to recognise where we might be in terms of the rules of engagement and the maturity of those technologies.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Madame, I may have misunderstood your question, because I read it as being about the ability of a sovereign nation to operate independently with a range of capabilities. Therefore, I will follow that through with a comment about the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. I think the CJEF is really testing our ability to engage alongside each other and still understand our own protocols and the levels of technology, particularly when we get into sharing very highly classified information.
We are learning some very good lessons from the CJEF initiative and I hope, as we get into the final stages of the exercise programme, to produce a full operating capability later next year, I think.
We will be in a position to be able to say precisely where we see those tensions. There are some difficulties at the moment between the UK and France because we classify information in a slightly different way. So we are having to work through those sorts of things, and that reads down into our ability to share technologies, because quite clearly we need to be able to pass data between our respective experts at an appropriate classification.
However, as I say, I think the CJEF initiative is the real litmus test of whether we are able to do that effectively, and I think the signs are encouraging. At least we now have an active conversation about the problems and our technical experts are now starting to get after those problems.
Guto Bebb: On the sovereign issue, one of the strengths of the programme is that both France and the United Kingdom were very open in terms of what our red lines were on sensitive information that we both have. But as the concept faces development, those red lines are kept in constant review, because as we develop the concept then the opportunity there to share information, if there is a clear potential advantage, is being kept under review, so that we can actually develop further.
So, yes, of course from a sovereign capability perspective, there are red lines that have been agreed at the outset, but they’ve been agreed on the basis of a willingness to talk and discuss whether those can be relaxed as we move forward, so that if we are looking at a capability emerging then we can slightly move the red lines, if necessary.
So it’s a very flexible approach, which again shows the degree to which we are protecting sovereign capability while highlighting the degree to which we are willing to work together.
Chair: Are there any more bids from French colleagues for a further question?
Q49 Charles de La Verpillière (Translation): I think that Great Britain is a part of a dialogue on the future air combat system and I wanted to know the degree of work done by Great Britain in this dialogue. That is my first question. My second question is the following: what could be the integration of the missiles we are talking about in this future air combat system?
Guto Bebb: I will have to ask your forgiveness on this one, because we will be announcing our combat air strategy in the next few days and it would be wrong of me, as a junior Minister, to take the opportunity away from more senior Ministers to make the announcement in the appropriate circumstances.
I can assure you that we have been working on our combat air strategy for several months. We are confident that we will be putting together a programme that will be interesting, innovative and exciting, and as part of the work that we are doing we are undoubtedly looking at the way in which we can integrate a system rather than a platform. So, the idea from the combat air strategy is that we are looking at the development of a system rather than simply a platform.
I suspect that you will see more details of our views on this issue in the next few days, but I also suspect that my political life would be in danger if I shared too much at the moment.
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: I would add only that when we were at Sandhurst, we recalibrated the future combat air system programme—the Anglo-French component of it—which I think is now reset, based on what I think industry, from both sides, was able to contribute to that.
That is, I think, going to show some really interesting ideas, particularly around a number of things: sensors, communication, navigation systems, software architecture, the vehicle systems themselves—what does that look like—and of course the propulsion systems that might contribute to it. So I think there is still a good stream of work, which will then be fed into the ideas going forward inside France, in collaboration with other European partners, but also into the context of the combat air strategy that we have been working through.
Sir Simon Bollom: Can I just follow up on your question on integration? For us and I am sure for the joint partnership, the issue of integration of weapons into an air platform in particular is very much one of the considerations in the concept phase. Integration of weapons on to platforms can be very expensive, and what we desire is to design a weapon that can be integrated easily through data changes from one platform to another. So that will be very much a factor that we are looking at in this concept phase.
Dr Lewis: Did I see another bid from a French colleague?
Q50 Jean-Charles Larsonneur (Translation): Thank you, Chair. Within this concept phase how do you view the issue of access for A2/D2? We talk about the access denial link to some missiles—for the S-200, S-300 and S-400 for example. Is this an issue that you have integrated—and how?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Certainly the concept phase will examine the contested environments that include anti-access area denial, as it is termed in the UK, capabilities; so it has to be able to operate in those sorts of environments going forward. They exist today. We do not anticipate that come the 2030s they will be any less capable than they are today. So, if you like, the minimum standard is where we are today. That is why the technology component of the concept phase is so important. It has got to be able to over-match those current systems.
Q51 Chair: Any more responses? In that case I shall just ask one last question—I have saved an easy one for the end. Let us just suppose that this new weapons system comes into being. I am asking you to look a few decades into the future: so you have very powerful, very accurate weapons capable in particular of striking at naval units. Yet the tendency in modern navies has been to have fewer and fewer very powerful and very expensive platforms.
How do you see the battle space at sea developing if technology of this sort is proven to be successful? Will it mean that expensive ships like aircraft carriers, assault ships, destroyers—which are really cruisers in all but name—will have to be conserved well out of harm’s way if up against an adversary armed with weapons of the very sort that we are trying to develop ourselves?
Are we therefore in danger of rerunning the argument about the development of Dreadnought battleships at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, which were likely to put the Royal Navy more than anyone else out of business, because we had more of the older ships that were going to become obsolescent?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: The Minister is looking at an Army officer and a retired Air Force officer for a commentary in this space. We are bound to be confronted with a more contested maritime environment than we find ourselves in today, that is our vision.
We recognise that we need to provide the appropriate levels of protection on those very high-end capital assets. That requires us to make sure that we continue to invest in platform protection—so the defence systems unique to the platforms themselves. They need to sit in a context in which you have a layered defence approach so that you have the ability to detect and treat an adversary at range. Clearly, as we do today, we will not put a high-end capital asset in harm’s way without the appropriate levels of protection around them.
Q52 Chair: Are we going to be trying to develop the antidote to the new missile system at the same time as we try to develop the missile system?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Undoubtedly so, because the reality of warfare through time has been that the asymmetric is always presented to you, and then we have to go asymmetric on the asymmetric. It is a constant battle for us to retain the advantage in that space. We expect not much of this to stand still, which is why the notion that you must be adaptable and flexible into the future becomes an important component of most of our thinking.
Q53 Chair: Why am I reminded of a cartoon from the 1960s or 1970s, which showed a worried looking trooper reporting to his battery commander that, “Our anti-anti-missile missile has just shot itself down”?
Lt General Sir Mark Poffley: Indeed so.
Q54 Mr Francois: While we have got you for a few minutes, gentlemen, the future combat air strategy as I understand it does not include helicopters. Bluntly, Leonardo down at Yeovil—what used to be Westland, in old money—is running out of work. We have had successful Anglo-French helicopter programmes in the past, such as the Puma, which we recently spent a lot of money upgrading to keep it in service in the 21st century. Minister, perhaps I can direct this to you first. Guto, has the Ministry given any consideration to any kind of future strategy for helicopters? What can you say about that?
Guto Bebb: Clearly, we have a long-term relationship with Leonardo that is quite unique in terms of the industrial relationships we have moving forward. The issue is primarily one of ensuring that the order book is supported. In terms of the view that we should a rotary wings strategy, I think I go back to the fact that the industrial relationship that we have with Leonardo is fairly unique. It is a significant vote of confidence in the capabilities of Leonardo.
The key thing we can do from an MoD perspective is to continue to support them very strongly in their export campaigns. Clearly, Leonardo has already moved from a situation where 80% of its turnover was dependent on the MoD. I think the current figure is closer to 40%. The ability of Leonardo to win contracts on an international basis is acknowledged. From our perspective in the MoD, we are there to support them.
We have a long-term agreement with them, but the key thing is that they have a capability that can attract export orders. There is a significant number of potential export orders that we are working with Leonardo to try to achieve.
Chair: If there are no more questions, I will take this opportunity to thank our panel and in particular our French counterparts and guests. Quite apart from the subject matter of this inquiry, I hope the message they will take back loud and clear is that the desire for the closest possible bilateral co-operation on defence issues remains completely undimmed and is completely irrespective of any issues to do with Britain’s continued membership or not of any aspect of the European Union. That has to be a unique selling point. Thank you all very much.
[1] SPEAR Cap 3 is in its Demonstration & Manufacture (D&M) at this time.
[2] This is the next 2-Star programme review in November 2018.
[3] The FC/ASW Concept Phase is not directly considering a UK sub-launched capability, although RN Tomahawk's current role is clearly similar to the surface launched land attack role being considered by FC/ASW.
[4] Sea Skua was retired from service in Mar 17 coincident with the removal from service of the Lynx helicopter. Sea Skua is not compatible with the replacement Wildcat aircraft.
[5] NSM is a Kongsberg missile that is being integrated by Raytheon as the US Prime into the USN Littoral Combat Ship.
[6] P8 aircraft are being procured for the RAF, which will be equipped with Harpoon.
APPENDIX 3 :
GLOSSARY
● A2/AD - Anti-Access/Area Denial
● ALIS - Autonomics Logistics Information System (UK)
● CADMID - ‘Concept, Assessment, Development, Manufacturing, In-service, Disposal’ cycle (UK)
● CAMM - Common Anti-Air Modular Missile
● CJEF - Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (UK and France)
● DE&S - Defence Equipment and Support (UK)
● DGA - Direction Générale de l'Armement (France)
● ECUs - Electronic Control Units
● EU - European Union
● FASW - Future Anti-Ship Weapon
● FASGW - Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon
● FCAS - Future Combat Air System
● FC/ASW - Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon
● FCM - Future Cruise Missile
● FSTA - Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft
● ITAR - International Traffic in Arms Regulations
● LMM - Lightweight Multi-Role Missile
● LMP - Military Programme Law (France)
● LRASM - Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
● MoD - Ministry of Defence (UK)
● NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
● NSM - Naval Strike Missile
● ONERA - National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research (France)
● SAR - Synthetic Aperture Radar
● SEAD - Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
● SGDSN - General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (France)
● USML - United States Munitions List
([1]) Ainsi, le programme FMAN/FMC vise notamment à produire les missiles qui succèderont aux missiles issus de cette coopération fondatrice.
([2]) Traité de coopération en matière de défense et de sécurité entre la République française et le Royaume de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, signé le 2 novembre 2010 par MM. Nicolas Sarkozy et David Cameron.
([3]) Traité de coopération en matière de défense et de sécurité entre la République française et le Royaume de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, article 1er.
([4]) Déclaration franco-britannique sur la coopération de défense et de sécurité du 2 novembre 2010.
([5]) Prévu par les accords de Lancaster House.
([6]) M. Julian Lewis et Mme Ruth Smeeth ont également participé aux auditions organisées à Londres.
([7]) Général de division.
([8]) Il s’agit de l’appel d’offres CASOM (Conventional Armed Stand-off Missile).
([9]) Devaux, J-P., et Ford, R., « Scalp EG / Storm Shadow : les leçons d’une coopération à succès », Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, recherches & documents, n°09/2018. Accessible ici.
([10]) Étude de la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique précitée.
([11]) La France et le Royaume-Uni ont ainsi lancé le programme de missile air-air à longue portée METEOR avec quatre autres nations européennes (Allemagne, Espagne, Italie, Suède) au début des années 2000. Par la suite, le Royaume-Uni a rejoint la coopération initiée par la France et l’Italie sur les systèmes de défense sol-air à partir du missile sol-air ASTER.
([12]) Missiles de type Exocet ou Harpoon que le FMAN a vocation à remplacer.
([13]) Le contrat a été notifié le 26 mars 2014.
([14]) Le 17 mai 2018, le ministre de la Défense britannique, M. Gavin Williamson, et la ministre des Armées, Mme Florence Parly, ont d’ailleurs salué la réussite d’un second tir d’essai, intervenu le 18 avril 2018 à partir d’un hélicoptère banc d’essai de type Panther de la division DGA Essais en vol sur une cible en mer, au large de l’île du Levant (Var, France).
([15]) À titre d’exemple, le 29 mars 2018, le délégué général pour l’armement, M. Joël Barre, a reçu son homologue britannique, le ministre des acquisitions de défense, M. Guto Bebb.
([16]) Cette dépendance mutuelle permet néanmoins à chaque pays de conserver un certain niveau d’autonomie. Elle ne doit pas être conçue comme irréversible.
([17]) L’accord intergouvernemental est entré en vigueur en 2016 après ratification par le Royaume-Uni et la France. En France, la loi du 7 octobre 2016 a autorisé l’approbation de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord concernant les centres d’excellence mis en œuvre dans le cadre de la stratégie de rationalisation du secteur des systèmes de missiles.
([18]) La Revue stratégique de 2017 en France et la National security strategy and strategic defence and security review de 2015 au Royaume-Uni.
([19]) Certes, une menace terroriste ou proto-étatique continuera à nourrir des conflits asymétriques. Depuis la création d’Al-Qaïda en 1987, la menace terroriste n’a cessé de se renforcer, conduisant à une démultiplication des groupes terroristes qui opèrent sur des espaces de plus en plus étendus. Face à ces ennemis qui s’installent sur le long cours, les forces conventionnelles françaises et britanniques auront toujours à conduire des actions dans le « bas du spectre », sans que la suprématie occidentale ne puisse être réellement contestée.
([20]) Plus de détails ici.
([21]) Sont notamment visés les avions chinois Chengdu J-20 ou russes Soukhoï Su-57.
([22]) Les deux pays se sont engagés, à moyen-terme, à consacrer 2 % de leur PIB à leurs armées.
([23]) La France dispose d’un porte-avion, le Charles de Gaulle, quand les britanniques en possèdent deux, le HMS Queen Elizabeth et le HMS Prince of Wales.
([24]) Au regard de ces trois capacités – la capacité de lutte anti-navires, la destruction des défenses aériennes ennemies et la capacité de frappe dans la profondeur –, l’on peut d’ailleurs s’interroger sur la pertinence de l’appellation retenue pour ce programme. De fait, la capacité SEAD n’est pas clairement identifiée, ce que l’on peut regretter.
([25]) Selon les informations transmises lors des auditions conjointes du 11 juillet 2018 à Londres.
([26]) Il existe deux versions mer-mer du missile Exocet : le mer-mer 38 (MM38), qui n’est plus fabriqué, et le mer-mer 40 (MM40), qui équipe aujourd’hui les forces françaises. Plusieurs générations du MM40 ont vu le jour : le Block 1, le Block 2 et, dernièrement, le Block 3.
([27]) Les forces britanniques opèrent la version mer-mer du Harpoon : le Roof Guided-Missile-84 (RGM-84). Deux générations de cette version du Harpoon sont entrées en service : le Block 1 et le Block 2.
([28]) Pour une analyse approfondie de ces sujets, on pourra se référer au rapport d’information sur les enjeux de la numérisation des armées présenté par MM. Olivier Becht et Thomas Gassilloud le 30 mai 2018.
([29]) L’attachement de nos deux pays à la poursuite du programme FMAN/FMC a ainsi été rappelé lors du Sommet de l’Elysée du 17 février 2012, du Sommet de Brize Norton du 31 janvier 2014, du Sommet d’Amiens du 3 mars 2016 et du Sommet de Sandhurst du 18 janvier 2018.
([30]) Il s’agit de l’instruction générale n°1516 relative au déroulement et à la conduite des opérations d’armement du 26 mars 2010.
([31]) Deux contrats d’étude ont été conclus en 2012 pour permettre un échange d’informations portant notamment sur les capacités ennemies, dont la connaissance la plus fine possible est essentielle à la définition du besoin opérationnel.
([32]) Le 28 mars 2017, le délégué général pour l’armement, M. Laurent Collet-Billon, et son homologue britannique, la ministre pour les acquisitions de défense, Mme Harriett Baldwin, ont en effet signé à Londres un accord relatif à l’étude de futures technologies de missiles menée par MBDA.
([33]) Cette phase débutera trois mois avant la fin de la tranche précédente.
([34]) Traduction. Seule la version originale fait foi. Accessible ici.
([35]) Audition de la mission conjointe qui s’est tenue à Londres le 11 juillet 2018.
([36]) Traduction. Seule la version originale fait foi. Accessible ici.
([37]) Voir ici pour plus de détails.
([38]) Think Defence, UK Complex (Guided) Weapons: Harpoon
([39]) http://australianaviation.com.au/2016/08/australia-shows-interest-in-lrasm-anti-ship-missile/
([40]) Traduction. Seule la version originale fait foi. Accessible ici.
([41]) Traduction. Seule la version originale fait foi. Accessible ici.
([42]) G. Evans (7 May 2017), Securing the Royal Navy’s future firepower, Naval Technology. Traduction. Seule la version originale fait foi.
([43]) R. Scott (2 October 2018), French Navy to receive MM40 Block 3C Exocet, Jane’s Missiles and Rockets
([44]) https://www.mbda-systems.com/product/otomat-mk2/ Traduction. Seule la version originale fait foi.
([45]) En juillet 2017, le gouvernement britannique a annoncé le lancement d’une National Security Capability Review (NSCR), destinée à actualiser la Strategic defense and security review de 2015. En 2018, il a été annoncé que la partie « défense » du NSCR serait séparée du reste et deviendrait le Modernising Defense Programme (MDP), placé sous la supervision du ministère de la Défense britannique. Le contenu du MDP devrait être dévoilé d’ici la fin de l’année 2018.
([46]) Date du référendum sur l’appartenance du Royaume-Uni à l’Union européenne.
([47]) Sommet franco-britannique de Sandhurst, 18 janvier 2018, communiqué conjoint.
([48]) Le Figaro, 20 septembre 2018.
([49]) Devaux, J-P., et Ford, R., « Scalp EG / Storm Shadow : les leçons d’une coopération à succès », Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, recherches & documents, n°09/2018. p.15.
([50]) Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. Etude précitée, p. 16.
([51]) Il n’existe pas de « listes noires », le principe étant un blocage par défaut des exportations d’armements.
([52]) Le programme METEOR prévoit par exemple un processus spécifique de concertation entre les nations partenaires avant que le pays exportateur ne délivre sa licence.
([53]) L’ITAR n’est pas le seul régime de contrôle par les autorités américaines. Il existe en effet d’autres outils de contrôle, comme l’EAR (Export Administration Regulation) ou les sanctions de l’OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control).
([54]) HM Government (21 April 2016), Defence Secretary welcomes deployable UK-France joint force; H. Ellis-Petersen and P. Beaumont, World reacts to overnight strikes on Syria by US, UK and French forces, The Guardian.
([55]) HM Government, Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation (2 November 2010), Cm 8174.
([56]) Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation: Article 1.
([57]) HM Government (2 November 2010), UK-France Defence Co-operation Treaty announced.
([58]) Since the Lancaster House Agreement was signed in 2010, UK-France Summits have taken place in Paris (2012), RAF Brize Norton (2014), Amiens (2016) and Sandhurst (2018).
([59]) Julian Lewis and Jean-Jacques Bridey (25 June 2018), Defensive positions, The House Magazine, p.26.
([60]) Julian Lewis and Jean-Jacques Bridey (25 June 2018), Defensive positions, The House Magazine, p.26.
([61]) In addition to this core group of Members, the following Defence Committee Members also participated in the London evidence session: Rt Hon Julian Lewis MP and Ruth Smeeth MP.
([62]) For a comprehensive list of the evidence sessions the Assemblée nationale's Standing Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces has held on this topic, see: Assemblée nationale, Mission d'information relative à la prochaine génération de missiles anti-navires.
[63] This was the CASOM (Conventional Armed Stand-off Missile) call for tenders.
[64]J-P. Devaux and R. Ford (September 2018), Scalp EG/Storm Shadow: les leçons d’une coopération à succès, recherches & documents, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, no. 09/2018.
([65]) J-P. Devaux and R. Ford (September 2018), Scalp EG/Storm Shadow: les leçons d’une coopération à succès, recherches & documents, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, no. 09/2018.
([66]) It was in this manner that France and the United Kingdom were brought into the launch of the METEOR long-range air-to-air missile programme with four other European nations (Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden) in the early 2000s. Subsequently, the United Kingdom joined the cooperation initiated by France and Italy on ground-to-air defence systems based on the ASTER ground-to-air missile.
([67]) The contract decision was announced on 26 March 2014, see: MBDA (27 March 2014), Press Release: MBDA to develop FASGW(H)/ANL, Next Generation Anglo-French Anti-Ship Missile
([68]) On 17 May 2018, the British Defence Minister, Mr Gavin Williamson, and the Minister of the Armed Forces, Mrs Florence Parly, also welcomed the success of a second test blast, carried out on 18 April 2018 from a Panther-type test bench helicopter of the DGA In-Flight Tests Division on an at-sea target, off Île du Levant (Var, France).
([69]) For example, on 29 March 2018, the General Delegate for Armaments, Mr Joël Barre, received his British counterpart, the Minister for Defence Acquisitions, Mr Guto Bebb.
([70]) Q58.
([71]) S.B.H. Faure (2019), Franco-British Defence Co-operation in the Context of Brexit, in, R. Johnson and J.H. Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom's Defence After Brexit: Britain's Alliances, Coalitions & Partnerships, Palgrave Macmillan, p.111.
([72]) HM Government (2 November 2010), UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation.
([73]) HM Government (2 November 2010), UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation.
([74]) This mutual dependence nevertheless allows each country to maintain a certain level of autonomy. It must not be conceived of as irreversible.
([75]) The intergovernmental agreement came into effect in 2016 after ratification by the United Kingdom and France. In France, the law of 7 October 2016 authorised the approval of the agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on centres of excellence, implemented further to the strategy to rationalise the missile systems sector.
([76]) Q55.
([77]) The Revue stratégique de 2017 in France and National security strategy and strategic defence and security review 2015 and National Security Capability Review 2018 in the United Kingdom.
([78]) Of course, a terrorist or proto-state threat will continue to fuel asymmetric conflicts. Since the creation of al-Qaeda in 1987, the terrorist threat has continuously developed, leading to an increase in the number of terrorist groups operating across increasingly vast expanses. In the face of these enemies taking position for the long-term, the French and British conventional forces will still have to run actions at the “bottom of the spectrum”, without any real challenge to Western supremacy.
([79]) M. Lubell and L. Barrington (10 February 2018), Israeli jet shot down after bombing Iranian site in Syria, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-iran/israeli-jet-shot-down-after-bombing-iranian-site-in-syria-idUSKBN1FU07L.
([80]) These target in particular Chinese Chengdu J-20 or Russian Sukhoi Su-57 aircraft.
([81]) Q76.
([82]) France has one aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle. The UK will have two in service by 2023: HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales.
([83]) Q79.
([84]) In view of these three capacities – the capacity to fight ships, the destruction of enemy air defences and the capacity to conduct deep strikes – the question can also be raised as to the relevance of the name chosen for this programme. In reality, SEAD capacity is not clearly identified, which is regrettable and could be remedied, if necessary, when the development phase is launched.
([85]) There are two sea-to-sea versions of the Exocet missile: the sea-to-sea 38 (MM38), which is no longer manufactured, and the sea-to-sea 40 (MM40), which now equips the French forces. Several generations of MM40 have emerged: Block 1, Block 2 and, most recently, Block 3.
([86]) The British operate the sea-to-sea version of Harpoon: Roof Guided-Missile-84 (RGM-84). Two generations of this version of the Harpoon came into service: Block 1 and Block 2.
([87]) For an in-depth analysis of these subjects, see the Assemblée nationale's Standing Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces information report on the challenges of digitising the armies, presented by Olivier Becht and Thomas Gassilloud on 30 May 2018: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/pdf/rap-info/i0996.pdf.
([88]) Our two countries’ commitment to continuing the FC/ASW programme was thus reiterated at the Elysée Summit of 17 February 2012, the Brize Norton Summit of 31 January 2014, the Amiens Summit of 3 March 2016 and the Sandhurst Summit of 18 January 2018.
([89]) Q68.
([90]) For example, General Order No. 1516 on the conduct and implementation of weapons operations as at 26 March 2010.
([91]) Q118.
([92]) Two study contracts were concluded in 2012 to enable an exchange of information relating in particular to enemy capacities, the finest possible knowledge of which is essential for defining the operational need.
([93]) On 28 March 2017, the General Delegate for Armament, Mr Laurent Collet-Billon, and his British counterpart, the Minister for Defence Acquisitions, Mrs Harriett Baldwin, signed an agreement in London on the study of future missile technologies carried out by MBDA.
([94]) This phase will begin three months before the end of the previous tranche.
([95]) Qq7, 56, 99-100.
([96]) Think Defence, UK Complex (Guided) Weapons: Harpoon.
([97]) Q26.
([98]) Imperial War Museum, Weapons and Ammunition: Sea Skua (Air-To-Surface Anti-Ship Missile).
([99]) R. Scott (28 March 2014), UK, France place long-awaited anti-ship missile contract, Jane's Navy International.
([100]) N. de Larrinaga (8 April 2014), France, UK sign GBP500 million anti-ship missile deal, Jane's Defence Industry; R. Scott (28 March 2014), UK, France place long-awaited anti-ship missile contract, Jane's Navy International.
([101]) HM Government (18 January 2018), UK-France Summit 2018: Security and Defence ; A second successful test-firing took place in April 2018.
([102]) https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/sea-venom-missile-successfully-completes-second-development-firing-test/.
([103]) Thales, Lightweight Multi-Role Missile.
([104]) Qq 26-28.
([105]) Think Defence, UK Complex (Guided) Weapons: Harpoon.
([106]) Qq26-27.
([107]) Raytheon, Naval Strike Missile, https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/naval-strike-missile-over-the-horizon-solution.
([108]) G. Evans (7 May 2017), Securing the Royal Navy's future firepower, Naval Technology.
([109]) R, Scott (2 October 2018), French Navy to receive MM40 Block 3C Exocet, Jane's Missiles and Rockets.
([110]) Q41; in July 2017 the UK Government announced that a National Security Capability Review (NSCR) was being initiated to 'refresh' the findings of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. In 2018 it was announced that the defence component of the NSCR would be separated and would operate, under MoD supervision, as the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP). It is expected the MDP will report before the end of 2018.
([111]) Qq33-39, 40.
([112]) Qq62, 110.
([113]) Q62.
([114]) Q62.
([115]) Q63.
([116]) Q110.
([117]) Q110.
([118]) Qq62, 92.
([119]) Q102.
([120]) Qq10, 56, 99.
([121]) Q115.
([122]) Q64.
([123]) Qq64, 77.
([124]) Q77.
([125]) Q115.
([126]) Q24.
([127]) Q69.
([128]) Q69.
([129]) Q23.
([130]) Q45.
([131]) Q61.
([132]) Q61.
([133]) Qq 2-4, 55, 57, 76.
([134]) Qq2-3.
([135]) Q84.
([136]) Q57.
([137]) Franco-British summit of Sandhurst, 18 January 2018, joint communiqué.
([138]) Le Figaro, 20 September 2018.
([139]) Q105.
([140]) Q75.
([141]) Q111.
([142]) Devaux, J-P., and Ford, R., "Scalp EG / Storm Shadow: the lessons of successful cooperation", Foundation for Strategic Research, Research & Documents, no. 09/2018, p.15.
([143]) Q23.
([144]) Devaux, J-P., and Ford, R., "Scalp EG / Storm Shadow: the lessons of successful cooperation", Foundation for Strategic Research, Research & Documents, no. 09/2018.
([145]) Q73.
([146]) Q112.
([147]) For example, the METEOR programme requires a specific consultation process between partner nations before the exporting country can issue its licence.
([148]) ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) is not the only control mechanism implemented by the US authorities. Other tools include the EAR (Export Administration Regulation) and the OFAC sanctions (Office of Foreign Assets Control).
([149]) Devaux, J-P., and Ford, R., "Scalp EG / Storm Shadow: the lessons of successful cooperation", Foundation for Strategic Research, Research & Documents, no. 09/2018.
([150]) 'France could replace US parts in SCALP missile to circumvent ITAR restrictions for Egypt, but at some delay', Janes, 2 August 2018.